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REFUGEES, RIGHTS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES:  
BRIDGING THE INTEGRATION GAP 
 
MEGAN J. BALLARD* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Closing U.S. borders to refugees will not likely enhance domes-
tic security.  The United Nations (“U.N.”) and some Western democ-
racies suggest that a policy of integrating refugees may more effec-
tively promote the security interests of both refugees and the 
countries in which they resettle.  Refugee integration is a multifac-
eted process requiring accommodation on behalf of individual refu-
gees and host societies.  The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) requires states admitting resettled refugees to facilitate 
their integration.  Contrary to this mandate, the U.S. government has 
not strived to integrate the refugees it has agreed to resettle within 
its borders.  Instead, federal policy emphasizes rapid and minimal 
economic self-sufficiency for refugees, which is consistent with 
other government policies that privatize social welfare for the poor.  
When compared to a theoretical model of refugee integration, this 
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article concludes that U.S. resettlement efforts fall short of an inte-
gration process.  To the contrary, the U.S. strategy of prioritizing im-
mediate participation in the work force undermines the successful 
incorporation of many refugees into American society.  This failure 
stands to impair the security interests of both refugees and host com-
munities. 
Community efforts can help fill the gap between the inadequate 
U.S. resettlement program and the UNHCR’s integration mandate.  
The Author has presented workshops on U.S. law to educate local 
refugees about their legal rights and responsibilities.  These work-
shops—described in this article—reflect one way in which host com-
munities can foster integration, even in the absence of a national in-
tegration policy.  Such a local effort can promote mutual 
understanding and safety. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
One week into his presidency, President Trump temporarily 
closed U.S. borders to refugees because of national security con-
cerns.1  While it was an abrupt policy shift at the time, the United 
States has a record of excluding immigrants based on race, national 
origin, gender, religion, and sexual orientation to protect national 
security and prevent cultural conflict.2  Many of these historical bar-
riers to immigration have proved either unconstitutional, unwise, or 
                                                      
1 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (§§ 5(a) and (d)) 
(announcing the Trump administration’s suspension of all refugee admissions on 
January 27, 2017 for at least 120 days and proclaiming that entry of more than 50,000 
refugees during the 2017 fiscal year would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States.  This order also temporarily barred travel from seven countries and 
indefinitely suspended travel from Syria); see also  Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (revising the previous order after a federal judge blocked 
it by similarly suspending refugee admissions, but reversing the indefinite ban on 
Syrian refugees, restricting travel from six countries, and making other changes); 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Office of Ad-
missions-Refugee Processing Center, Summary of Refugee Admissions as of 31-Decem-
ber-2016, www.wrapsnet.org/s/Graph-Refugee-Admissions-since-19751617.xls 
[https://perma.cc/34CZ-YYZH] (indicating that prior to these Executive Orders, 
the United States had increased the number of refugees it admitted in the five years 
preceding 2017).  See, e.g., Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for 
Fiscal Year 2017, Pres. Determ. No. 2016-13, 81 Fed. Reg. 70, 315, (Sept. 28, 2016) 
(noting that near the end of his second term President Obama authorized a thirty-
five percent increase in the number of refugees to be admitted during the fiscal year 
beginning October 2016—to 110,000—compared to the prior fiscal year). 
2 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Rubén G. Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are 
Models of Membership Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 4–5 (1998) 
(discussing the past U.S. practice of race-based immigration controls); see also 
MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 21–22 (2012) (explaining the previous U.S. policy of screening at 
the border for “perversion,” or homosexuality).  Organized opposition to immigra-
tion formed in the United States as early as the 1850s, in part out of concern that 
radical politics and other differences brought by newcomers could destabilize local 
populations.  See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 20 (2006) (discussing the rise of the nativist Know-
Nothing movement in the United States in the 1850s).  Laws to exclude or deport 
immigrants because of national security concerns are rooted in the late 1800s.  Id. at 
39.  See also MICHAEL FIX ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, HOW ARE REFUGEES 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/5
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both.3  Lawyers and others have criticized President Trump’s exclu-
sionary executive orders on similar grounds.4  At a time when rec-
ord numbers of people around the globe have fled their homes due 
to persecution, violence, or human rights abuses, closing the U.S. 
borders will only expose refugees to continued risks and fails to en-
hance safety in the United States.5  Moreover, the administration’s 
refugee ban, coupled with its anti-immigrant rhetoric, has fueled 
xenophobic and racist narratives further endangering refugees who 
have already relocated to the United States. 
To the extent that resettled refugees threaten domestic security, 
the United Nations (“U.N.”) and others suggest that integrating 
                                                      
FARING? INTEGRATION AT U.S. AND STATE LEVELS 7 (2017) (characterizing the Trump 
administration’s Executive Orders as marking a “sharp break with past policy.”). 
3 See Aleinikoff & Rumbaut, supra note 2, at 4–5 (noting “constitutional re-
strictions on state discrimination against aliens” as a feature of the current United 
States model of membership); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 2, at 64–65, 183, 188 
(concluding that exclusionary practices make immigrants feel unwelcome, render-
ing them reluctant to integrate). 
4 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (positing that the 
executive order violates the First, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments); Int’l Refugee As-
sistance Project v. Trump, 847 F.3d 554, 579 (D. Md. 2017) (claiming that the execu-
tive order violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 1119, 
1128 (D. Haw. 2017) (arguing that the executive order violates the First and Fifth 
Amendments). 
5 See Volker Türk, Assistant High Comm’r for Protection, Address to the 44th 
INTERPOL European Regional Conference: Security and International Refugee 
Protection-UNHCR’s Perspective, 2 (May 18–20, 2016), http://www.un-
hcr.org/573c8e987.pdf [https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170929155015/http://www.unhcr.org/573c8e987.pd] 
(“UNHCR has seen time and again that giving primacy to a security focus at the 
expense of ensuring refugee protection has failed to bring about the desired results, 
often at great expense to taxpayers”); see also Alex Nowrasteh, Little National Secu-
rity Benefit to Trump’s Executive Order on Immigration, CATO INSTITUTE (Jan. 25, 2017), 
https://www.cato.org/blog/little-national-security-benefit-trumps-executive-or-
der-immigration [https://perma.cc/2S4A-6RAW] (explaining, based on low num-
bers of foreigners convicted of terrorism-related offenses on U.S. soil, why the Ex-
ecutive Orders will not actually decrease the likelihood of such attacks or increase 
national security); see also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Global Trends: 
Forced Displacement in 2016, UNHCR (June 21, 2017), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-displacement-2016.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170929155606/http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-displacement-
2016.html] [hereinafter U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends 2016] (docu-
menting the record high numbers of forcibly displaced people around the world). 
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newcomers into the fabric of society can mitigate this risk.6  The 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) spe-
cifically instructs the thirty-seven official U.N. refugee resettlement 
states “to facilitate the integration of refugees recognized in their 
country.” 7  Through adaptation on the parts of both the host society 
and refugees, integration is intended to promote a resettlement 
state’s national security by minimizing disaffected ethnic enclaves.  
Many Western democracies formulated policies to facilitate this 
two-way integration process and build social cohesion in the early 
2000s following terrorist attacks in the United States and London. 
Integration also works to resolve refugees’ security concerns and 
ease the difficult process of resettlement.  Refugees have fled from 
their homes because of threats to their safety.  As they migrate seek-
ing protection, their security often continues to be at risk.  Resettle-
ment provides a significant measure of safety, but resettled refugees 
face the enormous task of learning about the language, customs, and 
culture of their new home.  At the same time, many newly resettled 
refugees contend with the longer-term effects of the violence or per-
secution that caused them to escape their prior communities.  Ad-
justing to a new environment within a community unreceptive to 
refugees is more challenging and can pose new threats to refugee 
safety.8  An integration process can help refugees and communities 
                                                      
6 Türk, supra note 5, at 4–5 (determining that integration within a host commu-
nity is central to the security of both the host community and refugees); see also 
Sergio Marchi, What is Migration Without Integration?, 24 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 22, 25 
(2005) (indicating that integration can help prevent immigrant groups from mar-
ginalization and becoming a destabilizing element in society). 
7 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The Integration of Resettled Refugees: Essen-
tials for Establishing a Resettlement Programme and Fundamentals for Sustainable Reset-
tlement Programmes, 6 (2013), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/resettle-
ment/52a6d85b6/integration-resettled-refugees-essentials-establishing-
resettlement-programme.html [https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170929204019/http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/reset-
tlement/52a6d85b6/integration-resettled-refugees-essentials-establishing-resettle-
ment-programme.html] [hereinafter U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration of 
Resettled Refugees]. 
8 See, e.g., ACLU of Idaho Launches 10-Language Anti-Harassment Campaign, 
IDAHO STATE J. (Jan. 11, 2017), http://idahostatejournal.com/members/aclu-of-
idaho-launches—language-anti-harassment-campaign/article_01a5fdd8-10ea-
5b1c-9e61-[https://perma.cc/37CX-U969] (launching an anti-harrassment cam-
paign in response to increased reports of harassment of refugees across Idaho and 
the entire country); Adeel Hassan, Refugees Discover 2 Americas: One that Hates, and 
One that Heals, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/11/15/us/refugees-discover-2-americas-one-that-hates-and-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/5
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adapt, lending further protection to refugees and the societies in 
which they relocate. 
The United States has accepted more refugees than all other re-
settlement states combined.9  Despite its prior status as a haven for 
resettled refugees, the United States has not expressly adopted a pol-
icy of integrating newly-arrived refugees.  If there is any prevailing 
policy that guides the layers of government involved in U.S. refugee 
resettlement it could be articulated as economic self-sufficiency 
through rapid employment.  This policy is nested within the broader 
neoliberal framework of privatizing social welfare.  As such, it is 
consistent with other programs for the poor that link benefits to 
work and sanction impoverished families and individuals for failure 
to comply with work requirements.10 
                                                      
one-that-heals.html [https://perma.cc/X9FL-3QPM] (recounting threats against 
refugees in communities across the United States); COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
111th Cong., ABANDONED UPON ARRIVAL: IMPLICATIONS FOR REFUGEES AND LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES BURDENED BY A U.S. RESETTLEMENT SYSTEM THAT IS NOT WORKING 
(Comm. Print 2010), at 7 [hereinafter ABANDONED UPON ARRIVAL] (reporting ten-
sions and confrontations between refugees and host communities in two U.S. cities 
in light of insufficient resettlement resources to the communities); FIX ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 2 (noting a “backlash” against the refugee program from communities 
concerned about budget shortfalls and unemployment rates); MELANIE NEZER, 
RESETTLEMENT AT RISK: MEETING EMERGING CHALLENGES TO REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT 
IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES 8, 10–13 (2013), http://www.hias.org/sites/de-
fault/files/resettlement_at_risk_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS9Z-PV4L] (discover-
ing that communities are becoming resentful of using scarce resources to meet the 
needs of resettled refugees, including communities debating banning additional 
refugees). 
9 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Resettlement Fact Sheet 2014, (2014), 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/579afcdc7 [https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170929160859/http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/579afcdc7] (re-
porting that 48,911 refugees departed for resettlement in the United States in 2014, 
out of a total of 73,008 worldwide); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Resettlement 
Fact Sheet 2015, (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/524c31a09 [https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170929161131/http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/524c31a09] (re-
porting that 52,583 refugees departed for resettlement in the United States in 2015, 
out of a total 81,893 worldwide); see also, U.S. STATE DEP’T, BUREAU OF POPULATION, 
REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JTJ5-2WHQ] (asserting that the United States receives over two-
thirds of all refugees resettled, “more than all other resettlement countries com-
bined.”).  The United States, however, is not one of the leading host countries for 
refugees.  See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Global Trends 2016, supra note 5, at 
17, and infra note 35, and accompanying text. 
10 Julie Nice, Poverty as an Everyday State of Exception, in ACCUMULATING 
INSECURITY, VIOLENCE AND DISPOSSESSION IN THE MAKING OF EVERYDAY LIFE 49, 64 
(Shelley Feldman et al., eds., 2011). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
 
192 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39.1 
 
This article makes two sets of assertions.  First, it contends that 
the free-market approach to resettling refugees not only fails to live 
up to the UNHCR integration mandate, but undermines it.  It 
reaches these conclusions by exploring the contours and conse-
quences of the rapid employment strategy.  It then analyzes the U.S. 
resettlement program compared to a persuasive conceptual integra-
tion framework.11  The theoretical model employed identifies inter-
dependent elements of integration, including the foundational ele-
ment of “citizenship and rights.”12  This analysis illustrates how the 
U.S. rapid employment emphasis falls short of—and impairs—long-
term integration. 
Second, the article prescribes community-based integration 
measures to fill the gap between inadequate U.S. resettlement poli-
cies and the UNHCR requirement that resettlement states promote 
integration.  There likely are endless variations of community-based 
interactions that can meet one or more elements of integration.  This 
article, however, focuses on the development of workshops to pro-
vide refugees with information on their legal rights and obligations 
based on the Author’s experience in coordinating such programs.  
These programs not only help meet the UNHCR’s integration man-
date, but they support even the limited economic self-sufficiency 
standard central to U.S. resettlement efforts. 
This work fortifies a weak realm within the scholarly discourse 
on forced migration and refugee resettlement.  Analyses of integra-
tion as a refugee resettlement policy or a normative concept in the 
United States is thin, as are scholarly efforts to locate the United 
States’ emphasis on economic self-sufficiency within an integration 
framework. 
The implications of this analysis may extend beyond refugee re-
settlement.  The two-way process of integration would likely pro-
mote the well-being and settlement of all immigrants in the United 
States, not just refugees.13  Similarly, such a process might help to 
alleviate the marginalization of the growing number of poor people 
                                                      
11 See Alastair Ager & Alison Strang, Understanding Integration: A Conceptual 
Framework, 21 J. OF REFUGEE STUD. 166 (2008); see also infra Section 3.3.2. 
12 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 166, 173. 
13 See, e.g., infra Section 3.3.3. (discussing Canada’s approach to integrating ref-
ugees and immigrants). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/5
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in the United States.14  While these issues are beyond the scope of 
the present work, they provide fertile ground for future exploration. 
This article begins by describing the international legal structure 
intended to balance the security interests of refugees and host soci-
eties.  Section 3 turns to resettlement policy trends, discussing the 
current emphasis on integration—a strategy that evolved, in part, to 
address the security concerns of resettlement states.  Here, the article 
explains a conceptual model of refugee integration that frames the 
remaining analysis.  It also briefly reviews Canada’s integration ef-
forts because many policy analysts suggest Canada is an exemplar 
of integration success.  This Section evaluates the U.S. resettlement 
focus on rapid economic self-sufficiency by comparing it to the the-
oretical integration model earlier described.  Doing so supports the 
conclusion that the U.S. refugee resettlement program not only fails 
to meet the UNHCR integration mandate, but it impairs successful 
resettlement for many refugees.  Finally, this Section prescribes com-
munity-based efforts to promote refugee integration.  Section 4 sug-
gests collaborative workshops on law and legal processes offered to 
refugees and immigrants as a step which not only tends to support 
the inadequate jobs first strategy in the United States, but also facil-
itates the integration of refugees.  This Section provides details of 
the collaboration and workshops with the hope that other commu-
nities will replicate this project. 
 
2.  INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK INTENDED TO PROTECT REFUGEES:  
DURABLE SOLUTIONS 
 
By the end of 2016, 65.6 million people around the globe had 
been forced to flee from their homes due to persecution, violence, or 
                                                      
14 An integration model may well facilitate the incorporation of poor people 
into a larger social and economic mainstream, but there is no requirement for doing 
so, akin to the UNHCR mandate for resettled refugees.  See U.N. High Comm’r for 
Refugees, Integration of Resettled Refugees, supra note 7. 
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human rights abuses.15  This staggering number of displaced people 
continues to grow.16 
Despite this surge in forced migration, the general international 
framework for protecting refugees has changed very little since the 
post-World War II period.  The protection regime is grounded in the 
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
and the 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”).17 
Drafters of the Refugee Convention worked to balance refugee 
security with security concerns of states and host communities.18  
The Convention establishes a limited definition of a “refugee” as a 
person who has crossed an international border, has a well-founded 
fear of persecution based on one of five specified reasons, and is un-
willing or unable to return home because of that fear.19  It excludes 
                                                      
15 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Global Trends 2016, supra note 5, at 2.  In 
2013, the number of people forcibly displaced around the globe exceeded for the 
first time those displaced by World War II.  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 
UNHCR Statistical Year Book 2013, 6 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statis-
tics/country/54cf9bd69/unhcr-statistical-yearbook-2013-13th-edition.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170929161332/http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/statistics/country/54cf9bd69/unhcr-statistical-yearbook-2013-13th-edi-
tion.html]. 
16 UNHCR reported that the numbers of displaced people have grown sub-
stantially since 1997.  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Global Trends 2016, supra note 
5, at 5.  While the conflict in Syria produced the largest displaced population in 
2015, significant numbers of people are being forced to flee their homes elsewhere 
in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe (Ukraine).  Id. at 6. 
17 This convention builds from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which protects people seeking asylum from persecution in other countries.  
Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Introductory Note, CONVENTION AND 
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 2 (DEC. 2010), http://www.un-
hcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf [https://perma.cc/B987-PZYE]. 
18 See Tu ̈rk, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that both security and protection “are best 
achieved through an integrated approach.”). 
19 “[A]ny person who . . . owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, 
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual resi-
dence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
return to it.”  United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, 
¶ A(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention], as 
amended by United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, ¶ 2, 
Dec. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. The original convention 
was approved in 1951 to protect people who became refugees before January 1, 1951 
because of war in Europe.  See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The 1951 Convention 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/5
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from international protection anyone responsible for serious non-
political crimes, war crimes, or crimes against peace or humanity, 
even though the person otherwise meets the definition of a refu-
gee.20  Moreover, the Convention allows host states to expel a previ-
ously-admitted refugee to protect national security or public order.21 
The Refugee Convention also identifies basic minimum stand-
ards for protecting displaced people who meet the refugee defini-
tion.22  It calls on contracting states to “as far as possible,” “facilitate 
the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.”23  The Convention’s 
nonrefoulement protection prohibits contracting states from return-
ing a refugee to a border or area where his or her life or freedom 
would be threatened because of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.24  In addition, 
the Convention obligates states to cooperate with the UNHCR.25  
The 1951 Convention, its 1967 protocol, or both have been ratified 
by 148 states, including the United States.26 
                                                      
Related to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 4 (Sept. 2011), http://www.un-
hcr.org/en-us/protection/convention/4dac37d79/reservations-declarations-
1967-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html [https://web.ar-
chive.org/web/20170929161555/http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/con-
vention/4dac37d79/reservations-declarations-1967-protocol-relating-status-refu-
gees.html] [hereinafter U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 1951 Convention].  The 1967 
Protocol removed the geographical and time limits.  The United States acceded to 
the 1967 Protocol in 1968 with two reservations.  See id. at 2, 5 (noting reservations 
to Article 29, on taxation of refugees, and to Article 24 1(b), on the provision of social 
security, to the extent that the provision is inconsistent with the U.S. Social Security 
Act); see also 1967 Protocol, supra. 
20 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 1951 Convention, supra note 19, at art. 1, ¶ 
F. 
21 Id. at art. 32. 
22 Different regional instruments offer additional protection for refugees.  See, 
e.g., Council Directive 2004/83/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EU); Org. of African Unity 
(OAU), Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 
Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium 
on the Int’l. Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mex.-Pan., Nov. 22, 1984, 
(http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=printdoc&do-
cid=3ae6b36ec) [https://perma.cc/NY6N-BU46]. 
23 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 1951 Convention, supra note 19, at art. 34. 
24 Id., at art. 33.  The Refugee Convention extends additional rights to refugees 
located in states that are party to it, including rights to court access (art. 16), to ed-
ucation (art. 22), to work (art. 17), to free movement within the territory (art. 26), 
and to travel documents (art. 28), among others. 
25 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 1951 Convention, supra note 19, at art. 35. 
26 Id. at 4. 
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The UNHCR addresses the plight of refugees through three “du-
rable solutions”—voluntary repatriation, local integration, or reset-
tlement.27  A durable solution is one that ends displacement so that 
refugees can “lead normal lives.”28  First, refugees can be voluntarily 
repatriated to their country of origin if the context allows return in 
safety and dignity.  Alternatively, refugees can be integrated into a 
host country that provides initial asylum.  This second solution 
should allow a refugee to integrate legally, economically, and so-
cially.  Finally, refugees can be resettled to a third country that has 
agreed to admit them as refugees with permanent residence status.29  
Resettlement is offered to less than one percent of the world’s refu-
gee population—traditionally to those identified by the UNHCR as 
most vulnerable.30 
The UNHCR works with thirty-seven “resettlement states,” in-
cluding the United States, to implement the third durable solution.31  
Of these countries, the United States accepts over half of all resettled 
                                                      
27 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 28 (July 
2011) [https://perma.cc/B45F-QS82][hereinafter UNHCR RESETTLEMENT 
HANDBOOK].  The U.S. Department of State recognizes these same durable solutions.  
See DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, 
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/about/index.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/JTJ5-2WHQ] (describing the work of the Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration as helping the international community develop durable 
solutions, and listing repatriation, local integration and resettlement as these solu-
tions). 
28 UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 28. 
29 Id.  UNHCR defines “resettlement” as follows: “Resettlement involves the 
selection and transfer of refugees from a State in which they have sought protection 
to a third State which has agreed to admit them—as refugees—with permanent res-
idence status.  The status provided ensures protection against refoulement and pro-
vides a resettled refugee and his/her family or dependents with access to rights 
similar to those enjoyed by nationals.  Resettlement also carries with it the oppor-
tunity to eventually become a naturalized citizen of the resettlement country.”  Id. 
at 3. 
30 NEZER, supra note 8, at 5.  See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT RESETTLEMENT, 4 (November 2013), http://www.un-
hcr.org/hk/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2016/04/FAQ-about-
Resettlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/DEY4-JZML] [hereinafter U.N. High Comm’r 
for Refugees, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS] (stating that resettlement generally 
“requires the identification of particularly vulnerable people within a much larger 
group of refugees.”). 
31 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends 2016, supra note 5, at 27. 
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refugees, with Canada and Australia the next two largest resettle-
ment states.32  Yet, when considering the magnitude of global forced 
displacement, the United States accepts a small number of refu-
gees.33  It admitted 85,000 in the fiscal year ending September 2016, 
at a time when the UNHCR reported 22 million refugees world-
wide.34  Developing regions in the global south host eighty-four per-
cent of the world’s overall refugee population.35 
The U.S. Refugee Act of 1980 (“Refugee Act”) is the first and 
most comprehensive federal legislation guiding the oversees refu-
gee admission program and establishing a process of asylum within 
U.S. borders.36  It codifies the U.N. Refugee Convention’s definition 
of “refugee”37 and allows refugees to petition to make their home in 
the United States by means of the durable solutions of resettlement 
or local integration through asylum.38  In other words, U.S. law pro-
                                                      
32 Id. 
33 From 2013 through 2015, when displacement was at record levels, the 
United States admitted less than 210,000 refugees from outside its borders and 
granted asylum to less than 46,000 within the United States.  The U.S. State Depart-
ment, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, reports that 209,846 refugees 
were admitted between 2013 and 2015, inclusive.  U.S. STATE DEP’T, BUREAU OF 
POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, CUMULATIVE SUMMARY OF REFUGEE 
ADMISSIONS (Dec. 31, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statis-
tics/251288.htm. [https://perma.cc/F8HU-4R8L].  The total number who have 
gained asylum status during those three years is 47,666.  NADWA MOSSAAD, DEP’T 
OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2015 6 (Nov. 2016), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refu-
gees_Asylees_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWM6-9FW9]. 
34 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends 2016, supra note 5 (report-
ing 22.5 million refugees at the end of calendar year 2016); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bu-
reau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Refugee Arrivals, supra note 1 (report-
ing total arrivals for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2016 at 84,995). 
35 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends 2016, supra note 5, at 2. 
36 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (amending the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 
1962).  See THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND 
POLICY 813 (7th ed. 2012) (noting that Congress was “focused on reforming the over-
seas refugee admissions programs.”). 
37 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201 (1980); Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (2014). 
38 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §§ 207 (resettlement), 208 (asylum) 
(1980); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157 (resettlement), 1158 (asy-
lum) (2014). 
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vides two avenues for a person to acquire refugee status: as a reset-
tled refugee from outside the United States and as a successful asy-
lum seeker from within the United States or at a U.S. port of entry. 
For this first avenue, the Refugee Act authorizes the President, 
in consultation with Congress, to establish a maximum number each 
year of refugees located outside of the United States who will be al-
lowed to resettle in the country.39  These refugees are often living in 
camps, settlement regions, or urban centers near conflict areas when 
they apply for resettlement.40  The U.S. government works with the 
UNHCR to identify and evaluate candidates for resettlement.  Once 
refugees approved for resettlement arrive in the United States at a 
location selected by the U.S. government, they work with a contract-
ing non-governmental organization (“NGO”) that receives federal 
money to help each newcomer.41 
The second avenue of gaining refugee status in the United States 
is very different.  Under the Refugee Act, the United States provides 
asylum to people who travel to the United States and successfully 
petition to remain based on meeting the definition of “refugee.”42  A 
                                                      
39 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (a) (2017). 
40 See NEZER, supra note 8, at 7 (reporting that many refugees have spent years 
in refugee camps prior to resettlement). 
41 See Donald Kerwin, The Faltering U.S. Refugee Protection System: Legal and Pol-
icy Responses to Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Others in Need of Protection, REFUGEE 
SURV. Q. 1, 6-8 (describing the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, including the role 
of NGOs, or “voluntary resettlement agencies.”). 
42 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, § 208 (1980); Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1158 (2014).  Any immigrant present in the United States, or 
at a port of entry, may claim they meet the definition of a refugee and seek asylum 
in order to legally remain in the United States.  The two primary ways of seeking 
asylum are affirmative and defensive.  ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 814.  A 
less significant route to asylum is derivative asylum status as the spouse or child of 
a person granted asylum.  In 2014, the United States granted asylum to 4,735 
spouses and children.  DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (last visited July 8, 2016), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refu-
gees_Asylees_2014.pdf.  [https://perma.cc/8S26-EPEN].  With an affirmative 
claim, an immigrant submits a petition to a U.S. Customs and Immigration Service 
(“USCIS”) asylum officer, under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Se-
curity.  ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 815.  A defensive asylum request occurs 
within the context of removal proceedings before an immigration judge in the Ex-
ecutive Office for Immigration Review of the Department of Justice.  Id. at 816.  An 
immigrant without proper authorization to enter the United States may be sub-
jected to an expedited removal process at a U.S. border or other port of entry.  Id. at 
817.  If the person claims a fear of returning to their home country, he or she will 
undergo a “credible fear” interview with a USCIS asylum officer.  8 U.S.C. § 1225 
(2012).  If the immigrant establishes a significant possibility of asylum, USCIS refers 
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successful claimant who is granted asylum—an asylee—may re-
main in the United States, but is not offered the same kind of assis-
tance initially extended to resettled refugees.43 
Many scholars and practitioners consider the UNHCR’s three 
durable solutions to be outdated and ineffective.44  In particular, 
these options fail to adequately protect refugees from ongoing 
threats to their personal safety and provide no remedy for the grow-
ing numbers of refugees who are victims of protracted conflicts.45  
Refugees leave their homes because of threats to their security from 
state agents or from actors the government is unable or unwilling to 
control.46  As they migrate for protection, their security often contin-
ues to be at risk by conflict in surrounding areas, landmines, and 
                                                      
the case to immigration court.  ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 5, at 817.  The process 
from here is similar to an affirmative claim.  The numbers of asylum grants (both 
affirmative and defensive) has been decreasing.  In 2012, 28,115 individuals were 
granted asylum, decreasing to 25,100 in 2013, and again to 23,533 in 2014.  DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2014 (last visited 
July 8, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refu-
gees_Asylees_2014.pdf. [https://perma.cc/JNW4-GYWE]. 
43 Lindsay M. Harris, From Surviving to Thriving?: An Investigation of Asylee In-
tegration in the United States, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 29, 45 (2016).  None-
theless, both resettled refugees and asylees are entitled to some federal benefits, 
such as Social Security, Medicaid, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.  
Id. at 44. 
44 See, e.g., Debra Pressé & Jessie Thomson, The Resettlement Challenge: Integra-
tion of Refugees from Protracted Refugee Situations, 25 REFUGE: CANADA’S J. ON 
REFUGEES 94 (2008); Nora Tyeklar, The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Process: A Path to 
Self-Sufficiency or Marginalization?, in REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 
LANGUAGE, POLICY, PEDAGOGY 152, 155 (Emily M. Feuerherm & Vaidehi Rama-
nathan, ed., 2016) (suggesting that “oftentimes, such ‘durable solutions’ are durable 
not for refugees, but for the status quo that upholds the positions of dominant in-
stitutions and ideologies already in place.”). 
45 The UNHCR reports that two-thirds of all refugees were in “protracted ref-
ugee situations” at the end of 2016, defined as “one in which 25,000 or more refu-
gees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more 
in a given asylum country.”  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends 2016, 
supra note 5, at 22. 
46 To meet the legal definition of a refugee under U.S. law, a person must 
demonstrate persecution or fear of persecution from the government in the country 
from which the person fled or from actors the government was unwilling or unable 
to control.  See, e.g., Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2010); M.A. 
A26851062 v. U.S. I.N.S., 858 F.2d 210, 218 (4th Cir. 1988). 
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outlaws who exploit their vulnerability, especially targeting women 
and children.47 
Even from the relative safety of a first host country, new security 
threats can emerge from inhospitable local populations or criminal 
activity in refugee camps.48  Millions of refugees are exiled to these 
camps or other holding areas for indefinite periods of time, unable 
to access any of the “solutions.”49  Ongoing conflict prevents their 
return to war-torn homes and inhospitable conditions preclude their 
settling permanently in the country of first asylum.50 
The refugees who survive these significant security challenges 
have themselves been perceived as security threats since the attacks 
in the United States on September 11, 2001.  Governments world-
wide have tightened refugee admissions procedures and turned 
asylum seekers away because of national security concerns.51  Ap-
prehensions of resettlement states render relocation to a third coun-
try elusive for most refugees. 
While the prior discussion introduces the legal definition of a 
refugee, it does not completely address different socio-linguistic 
meanings of the term “refugee.”  Many resettled refugees, or people 
who become asylees after arrival in the United States, do not want 
to be defined by a legal status associated with difference and exclu-
sion.  A refugee or asylee may wish to be known as a former refugee, 
an immigrant, a citizen, or by adopting different self-references in 
different contexts, or eschewing any labels.52  While acknowledging 
                                                      
47 Volker Türk, Forced Migration and Security, 15 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 113, 114, 
117 (2003) [hereinafter Türk, Forced Migration]. 
48 Id., at 113, 117.  See also DeBrenna LaFa Agbéjyiga et al., Expanding Our Com-
munity: Independent and Interdependent Factors Impacting Refugees’ Successful Commu-
nity Resettlement, 13 ADVANCES IN SOC. WORK 306 (2012) (reporting on refugee camp 
conditions, including torture, starvation, rape, assault, and harassment). 
49 Pressé & Thomson, supra note 44, at 94 (“More and more refugees find them-
selves “warehoused” in refugee camps for years, without access to a durable solu-
tion.”). 
50 See, e.g., Migration: Looking for a Home, THE ECONOMIST, May 28, 2016 (ex-
plaining that many Syrian refugees in Germany fled not from Syria directly but 
from Lebanon where they were attempting to wait out the conflict). 
51 Türk, Forced Migration, supra note 47, at 115. 
52 Emily M. Feuerherm & Vaidehi Ramanathan, Introduction to Refugee Resettle-
ment in the United States: Language, Policies, Pedagogies, in REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES, LANGUAGE POLICE, PEDAGOGY 1, 2 (Emily M. Feuerherm & 
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this spectrum of preferences, this article uses the term refugee in its 
legal sense, which means any person who lawfully resides in the 
United States because of having met the 1980 Refugee Act and Ref-
ugee Convention’s definition of a refugee. 
 
3.  REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 
 
Large-scale forced migration across the globe has brought atten-
tion to various theories and practices of refugee relocation that have 
evolved over time.  These approaches run the gamut from assimila-
tion to multiculturalism, with integration located somewhere be-
tween these poles.  Many resettlement states—such as Canada—
have adopted integration as a policy for resetting refugees.  This sec-
tion briefly outlines Canada’s integration measures because policy 
analysts have touted them as a model of success.  By contrast, the 
United States has not adopted an integration policy.  Instead, the 
U.S. resettlement program champions rapid economic self-suffi-
ciency, reflecting a neoliberal economic philosophy that undermines 
long-term integration.  This Section asserts that introducing reset-
tled refugees to their legal rights and responsibilities through a com-
munity-based workshop supports integration, and also advances 
the more limited goal of speedy economic independence. 
 
3.1.  Theory and Policy 
 
During the early part of the 20th century, many western democ-
racies sought to assimilate immigrants.53  Host societies expected 
                                                      
Vaidehi Ramanathan, eds., 2016) (suggesting that some refugees may avoid the la-
bel to distance themselves from any perceived negative connotations, while others 
actively use it to access rights or resources). 
53 See, e.g., Nicole Ives, More Than a “Good Back”: Looking for Integration in Refu-
gee Resettlement, 24 REFUGE: CANADA’S J. ON REFUGEES 54, 55 (2007) (“[t]raditional 
adaptation research is based on the assumption that increased participation in the 
host culture requires detachment from the culture of origin”) (citing MILTON M. 
GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE (1964) and H.B.M. Murphy, The Assimila-
tion of Refugee Immigrants in Australia, 5 POPULATION STUD. 179 (1952)). 
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newcomers to assimilate into the mainstream and become indistin-
guishable from it.54  Assimilationism eventually gave way in the 
1960s to a multicultural approach, or ethnic pluralism.55  Different 
groups of immigrants were expected to co-exist with host societies, 
but were encouraged to maintain their independent cultural and re-
ligious identities.56 
Multiculturalism lost favor after terrorist incidents occurred in 
Western democracies, notably the September 11, 2001 attacks in the 
United States and the July 7, 2005 London bombings.  Critics blamed 
multiculturalism for fostering ethnic enclaves and cultural separa-
tism.57  Some suggested that multiculturalism facilitated terrorism.58  
Beginning in the early 2000s, Western democracies generally have 
adopted policies to integrate refugees.  Integrating newcomers into 
a host society reflects the view that a middle road between assimila-
tion and multiculturalism will best foster social cohesion and 
safety.59 
                                                      
54 See Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 174–75; Marko Valenta & Nihad Bunar, 
State Assisted Integration: Refugee Integration Policies in Scandinavian Welfare States: the 
Swedish and Norwegian Experience, 23 J. OF REFUGEE STUD. 463, 468 (2010); see also DAN 
PFEFFER, GROUP INTEGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM: THEORY, POLICY, AND 
PRACTICE 47 (2015) (discussing the Chicago School of sociologists and defining as-
similation as “‘a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and 
groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and 
groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in 
a common cultural life’”) (quoting ROBERT EZRA PARK & ERNEST WATSON BURGESS, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY 735 (1969)). 
55 See, e.g., Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 174; IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A 
CITIZEN: INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
CANADA 109 (2006) (describing the shift in the United States away from assimilation 
towards diversity, concurrent with the civil rights movement in the 1960s). 
56 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 174–75. 
57 Melinda McPherson, ‘I Integrate, Therefore I Am’: Contesting the Normalizing 
Discourse of Integrationism through Conversations with Refugee Women, 23 J. OF REFUGEE 
STUD. 546, 550 (2010). But see Peter Kivisto, Introduction: The Puzzle of Incorporation 
and Solidarity in, THE SOCIOLOGICAL Q. 581, 581 (2015) (arguing that multiculturalism 
is misunderstood and that it is about incorporation rather than separateness). 
58 Jenny Phillimore, Implementing Integration in the UK: Lessons for Integration 
Theory, Policy and Practice, 40 POL’Y & POLITICS 525, 528 [hereinafter Phillimore, Im-
plementing Integration] (explaining that the backlash in the United Kingdom against 
multiculturalism began in 2006 from growing beliefs that multiculturalism pro-
moted separateness and terrorism and worked against shared common values) 
(quoting S. VERTOVEC & S. WESSENDORF, THE MULTICULTURALISM BACKLASH 1 (2010)). 
59 McPherson, supra note 57, at 547 (describing integration as a “middle road” 
between the “extremes of assimilationism and multiculturalism,” but suggesting 
that integrationism remains focused on conformance). 
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3.1.1.  Refugee Integration   
 
While social scientists have studied immigrant incorporation in 
general, scholarship from U.S. analysts on refugee integration as a 
policy or normative concept is largely lacking.60  Much of the nor-
mative work on refugee integration stems from scholars outside of 
the United States.61  U.S.  social work professors and health care 
scholars have surveyed refugees for indicators of successful resettle-
ment or cultural adaptation, often concentrating on specific nation-
alities or ethnic groups.62  Legal scholarship tends to center on cri-
tiques of the mechanics and funding for the U.S. Resettlement 
Assistance Program (“USRAP”).63 
                                                      
60 See, e.g., RICHARD ALBA & NANCY FONER, STRANGERS NO MORE: IMMIGRATION 
AND THE CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATION IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE 
(2015), and Aleinikoff & Rumbaut, supra note 2 (analyzing immigrant integration 
in general); see also FIX, et al.,  supra note 2 (proporting to measure refugee integra-
tion through limited data on employment rates and other economic indicators); 
DAVID SYSSEGAARD KALLICK & SILVA MATHEMA, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, 
REFUGEE INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES, June 2016 (providing data related to 
Bosnian, Burmese, Hmong, and Somali immigrants—not specifically refugees—
identifying a “high degree of correspondence between people in these groups and 
refugees.”)  Id. at 43. 
61 See, e.g., McPherson, supra note 57; Jenny Phillimore & Lisa Goodson, Making 
a Place in the Global City: The Relevance of Indicators on Integration, 21 J. OF REFUGEE 
STUD. 305 (2004); Kathleen Valtonen, From the Margin to the Mainstream: Conceptual-
izing Refugee Settlement Processes, 17 J. OF REFUGEE STUD. 70, 76 (2004) (reporting on 
a study of refugees and asylees in Finland). 
62 See, e.g., Fern R. Hauck, et al., Factors Influencing the Acculturation of Burmese, 
Bhutanese, and Iraqi Refugees into American Society: Cross-Cultural Comparisons, 12 J. 
OF IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE STUD. 331 (2014); Ives, supra note 53, at 54; Isok Kim, Be-
yond Trauma: Post-resettlement Factors and Mental Health Outcomes Among Latino and 
Asian Refugees in the United States, J. OF IMMIGR. & MINORITY HEALTH, 1–9 (2015); 
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN INSTITUTE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL 
ASSAULT & NORTH CAROLINA AGRICULTURAL AND TECHNICAL STATE UNIVERSITY, THE 
CONTINUITY OF RISK: A THREE-CITY STUDY OF CONGOLESE WOMEN-AT-RISK RESETTLED 
IN THE U.S. 23 (Sept. 2014) http://sites.utexas.edu/idvsa/the-continuity-of-risk-a-
three-city-study-of-congolese-women-at-risk-resettled-in-the-u-s/ 
[https://perma.cc/V7RZ-CM3N] [hereinafter CONTINUITY OF RISK] (highlighting 
the U.S. resettlement experiences of refugees from specific countries). 
63 See, e.g., Ives, supra note 53; Stephen Meili, US Refugee Resettlement Policy and 
International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: A Mixed Record, 2 INT. J. MIGRATION & 
BORDER STUD. 1, 13 (2016) (finding that the availability of health and social welfare 
programs to refugees in the United States is laudable “at least as written” but that 
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There is no universally accepted definition of—or model for— 
refugee integration.64  Many scholars view integration as an interac-
tive and multidimensional process involving roles for a host com-
munity and its institutions, as well as for the refugees themselves.65 
The UNHCR also considers integration to be a multidimensional 
process, suggesting that: “Integration in the refugee context is the 
end product of a multifaceted and on-going process, of which self-
reliance is but one part.  From the host society, it requires communi-
ties that are welcoming and responsive to refugees and for public 
institutions to meet the needs of a diverse population.  Integration 
also requires a preparedness on the part of the refugees to adapt to 
the host society, without having to forego their own cultural iden-
tity.”66 
                                                      
programs are significantly impaired by their short, eight-month duration and in-
come eligibility requirements, as well as the language barriers and other cultural 
impediments that have resulted in many refugees failing to receive program ser-
vices.); GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, REFUGEE 
CRISIS IN AMERICA: IRAQIS AND THEIR RESETTLEMENT EXPERIENCE, 2009, http://schol-
arship.law.georgetown.edu/hir_papers/4 [https://perma.cc/2A2P-GGBS]; 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REFUGEE 
RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EXAMINATION OF CHALLENGES AND 
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS (May 2010),  https://sipa.columbia.edu/sites/de-
fault/files/IRCFINALREPORT_0.pdf. 
64 Ager & Strang supra note 11, at 167 (quoting CASTLES, ET AL., INTEGRATION: 
MAPPING THE FIELD (2001)). 
65 Phillimore & Goodson, supra note 61, at 308–09. Alison Strang & Alastair 
Ager, Refugee Integration: Emerging Trends and Remaining Agendas, 23 J. OF REFUGEE 
STUD. 589, 600 (2010) [hereinafter Strang & Ager, Emerging Trends].  But see 
Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 529 (explaining that while ac-
ademics tend to view integration as a two-way process, governmental integration 
policy in the United Kingdom “operates as if integration is one way,” and appears 
to take an assimilationist approach). 
66 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration – A Fundamental Component in 
Supporting Diverse Societies, 1 (Jan. 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/56a9decf5.pdf 
[hereinafter U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration – A Fundamental Compo-
nent].  While the UNHCR has defined integration, it has not prescribed specific pol-
icies for an integration program.  Rather, it maintains that “there is no single, set 
prescription for the establishment and delivery of an integration programme.”  
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration of Resettled Refugees, supra note 7 at 8.  
Nonetheless, the UNHCR has identified three “inter-related and quite specific di-
mensions” of integration: 1) a legal process, under which resettlement states grant 
refugees progressively broader rights and entitlements generally commensurate 
with those enjoyed by citizens; 2) an economic process, through which refugees be-
come progressively less reliant on state aid; and 3) a social and cultural process that 
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Another source succinctly concludes that integration is “the abil-
ity to participate fully in economic, social, cultural and political ac-
tivities, without having to relinquish one’s own distinct ethnocul-
tural identity and culture.  It is at the same time a process by which 
settling persons become part of the social, institutional, and cultural 
fabric of society.”67 
 
3.1.2.  Refugee Integration Model   
 
Perhaps related to the difficulties of precisely defining integra-
tion, there are few theoretical models for refugee integration.  In an 
influential work published in 2008, British scholars Alastair Ager 
and Alison Strang presented what they term a “mid-level theory” 
that conceptualizes the key elements of refugee integration.68  In 
identifying a hierarchy of ten interdependent domains of integra-
tion, Ager and Strang relied on existing literature of refugee integra-
tion, as well as fieldwork in refugee resettlement and other data.69  
Exploring this framework in more detail provides a baseline for as-
sessing the present refugee resettlement priorities in the United 
States, leading to the conclusion that the U.S. resettlement program 
does not aspire to integration.  It also sets the stage for this article’s 
argument that community-based education for refugees on legal 
rights and responsibilities contributes to successful refugee integra-
tion. 
Ager and Strang’s framework identifies the following ten do-
mains of integration, classifying them into different tiers according 
to the functions they serve.  These domains include: 1) employment, 
                                                      
enables refugees to live within a host community without discrimination or exploi-
tation and to actively contribute to the social life of their new country.  U.N. High 
Comm’r for Refugees, Integration – A Fundamental Component, supra note 66, at 1. 
67 Valtonen, supra note 61, at 74 (citing Raymond Breton, Report of the Academic 
Advisory Panel on the Social and Cultural Impacts of Immigration, CANADA: RESEARCH 
DIVISION, STRATEGIC PLANNING AND RESEARCH, IMMIGRATION POLICY GROUP, 
EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION (1992)). 
68 Ager & Strang, supra note 11. 
69 Id. at 167–69. 
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2) housing, 3) education, and 4) health;70 5) social bridges,71 6) social 
bonds,72 and 7) social links;73 8) language and cultural knowledge, 
and 9) safety and stability;74 and 10) citizenship and rights.  This final 
element of citizenship and rights is the foundation of the integration 
framework. 
Public policy tends to focus on the first four domains: employ-
ment, housing, education, and health.75  While these domains reflect 
important aspects of integration into a new society, reliance on them 
alone to define and measure integration is incomplete.  For example, 
an assessment of employment data depends on who has the legal 
right to work, and what legal safety nets might exist for those unable 
to work.  This concern led Ager and Strang to inquire about the 
“standards and expectations” of a society to help facilitate a mean-
ingful evaluation of integration within that society.76  Addressing 
that question led to the identification of citizenship and rights as the 
foundation on which Ager and Strang’s integration model rests. 
Ager and Strang leave the parameters of citizenship and rights 
porous, indicating that the terms are informed by each state’s no-
tions of nationhood and identity.  Yet their discussion of this domain 
suggests a significance broader than legal citizenship and its associ-
ated rights.77  At its heart, this domain suggests the values and prac-
tices, including rights and responsibilities, that define membership 
                                                      
70 Id. at 169 (identifying four domains—employment, housing, education, and 
health— as the “markers and means” domains, considered both as indicators of 
successful integration as well as paths to achieve integration). 
71 Id. at 179 (defining social bridges as the relationship between refugees and 
host communities). 
72 Social bonds are the connections that link members of a group, such as fam-
ily or “like-ethnic groups.”  See id. at 178 (noting the positive impact of maintaining 
connections with family and “like-ethnic groups” on integration). 
73 Social links reflect “connections between individuals and structures of the 
state, such as government services.”  Id. at 181.  These three domains—social 
bridges, social bonds, and social links—form the “social connections” tier that 
drives the process of integration at a local level.  See id. at 177. 
74 These two domains comprise the “facilitators” tier that helps to remove bar-
riers to integration.  See id. at 181. 
75 Joanne Van Selm, Refugee Resettlement, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
REFUGEE AND FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES 512, 521 (Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, et al., 
eds., 2014) (noting that European countries focus programs on housing, education 
and healthcare, while the United States emphasizes employment). 
76 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 173. 
77 Audrey Macklin, Who is the Citizen’s Other? Considering the Heft of Citizenship, 
8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 333, 334 (2007) (defining legal citizenship as “formal 
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in a polity.78  Integration within the polity requires an articulation of 
the norms and expectations associated with membership.  In other 
words, becoming integrated reflects the idea that both existing 
members of the polity and newcomers understand what it means to 
belong and to participate in the civic, political, social, and economic 
life of society.79 
The community law and justice workshops discussed in Section 
4 help to familiarize refugees with the rights and responsibilities of 
incorporation in society.  As such, the workshops contribute to this 
foundation of integration.  The workshops also strengthen the social 
connections domains (social bridges, bonds, and links).  Social 
bridges are constructed through interaction between refugee partic-
ipants and dozens of volunteer lawyers, judges, and law students 
from the community.  Social bonds are fashioned because refugees 
work with others from within their ethnic groups and with those 
sharing the same language but who hail from different communi-
ties.  Social links are created by fostering interaction between refu-
gees and state actors, notably judges, police, as well as public pros-
ecutors and defenders. 
The intentions and aspirations of refugees contribute substan-
tially to the process of integration.80  Importantly, refugees have 
identified understanding their rights and duties in their new society 
as a resettlement goal.81  The author of one study found that refugees 
were: 
                                                      
status of membership in a state, or nationality as it is understood in international 
law”, and characterized by associated rights that commonly include the “right to 
enter and remain in the territory, access to consular assistance and diplomatic pro-
tection, and the franchise.”). 
78 For example, this foundational domain is central to a version of the United 
Kingdom’s policy describing integration “as the process that takes place when ref-
ugees are empowered to achieve their full potential as members of British society 
to contribute to the community, and become fully able to exercise the rights and 
responsibilities that they share with other residents.”  Ager & Strang, supra note 11, 
at 175 (quoting HOME OFFICE, INTEGRATION MATTERS: A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR 
REFUGEE INTEGRATION, 2005). 
79 MOTOMURA, supra note 2, at 13.  Citizenship in this sense reflects “social citi-
zenship,” rather than the more restrictive legal citizenship; the “package of rights, 
responsibilities, entitlements, duties, practices and attachments that define mem-
bership in a polity.”  Macklin, supra note 77, at 334. 
80 See Strang & Ager, Emerging Trends, supra note 65, at 595. 
81 Valtonen, supra note 61, at 76 (reporting on a study of refugees and asylees 
in Finland). 
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acutely aware of their lack of information and understanding 
of the  structure and organization of the formal institutions of 
society,  and of their position in relation to these.  Such infor-
mation is critical  for grasping the parameters of their mem-
bership in the society, and  for gauging the scope of oppor-
tunity for exercising ‘substantive’  citizenship.82 
Resettled refugees are not the only group in our society on the 
outskirts of the polity, working towards substantive membership.  
A growing number of impoverished families and individuals are ex-
cluded from meaningful participation in and protection by the 
state.83  An assault on benefit programs has eliminated safety nets 
for millions of poor people, and legislative enactments and associ-
ated judicial interpretations of them have precluded substantive le-
gal protection for economic rights.84 
Marginalized poor people in the United States could likely ben-
efit from a two-way integration process that incorporates many of 
the domains identified by Ager and Strang.  A full exploration of 
applying an integration model to incorporate poor people more se-
curely within the polity is beyond the scope of this article.  Nonethe-
less, it is worth noting that there is no international or domestic re-
quirement to integrate poor people akin to the UNHCR’s integration 
mandate for refugees.  Consequently, even if an integration model 
proved to empower impoverished Americans, programs would 
likely be left to local community efforts, resembling this article’s pro-
posal for community-based integration measures. 
At least one scholar has criticized integration policies for refu-
gees, suggesting that “integrationism” is “concerned with the adap-
tation by outsiders to local norms,” or facilitating conformity.85  
Comments by refugees in Europe similarly reflect the concern that 
integration really means complete assimilation.  As one lamented, 
                                                      
82 Id. at 77. 
83 See Nice, supra note 10, at 49–50 (asserting that the state has abandoned most 
improverished families pursuant to the “war on welfare” led by U.S. policy mak-
ers). 
84 See id. at 50, 57, 63–64. 
85 McPherson, supra note 57, at 547, 551.  Some criticism may be in response to 
governmental policies that use the language of integration, but reflect an assimila-
tionist approach by expecting refugees to adapt with no similar expectations on the 
host society.  See Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 528–29 (de-
scribing the UK’s “integration” policy as adopting a one-way assimilative stance). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/5
 
2017] Refugees, Rights, and Responsibilities 209 
 
“[e]ven if we make every effort and try to be ‘integrated,’ we are 
constantly reminded that to be properly and completely integrated, 
we must give up our principles and our religion.”86 
A related concern is the potential impact, if any, of a national 
integration policy.  Some analysts suggest that national models or 
cultural norms of integration matter little outside of formalistic rules 
of gaining citizenship, at least when considering the broader popu-
lation of all immigrants.87  Moreover, an articulation of a national 
integration policy cannot alter historically-rooted institutions and 
dynamics that affect integration, such as patterns of racism, residen-
tial segregation, and educational inequality.88  Others, however, 
maintain that the formal and social context of integration matters.  
Governmental policies regarding immigration powerfully influence 
understandings of citizenship and inclusion in the polity.89 
Regardless of the contested nature of integration, UNHCR reset-
tlement states “have an obligation to facilitate the integration of ref-
ugees in their countries.”90  The UNHCR indicates that resettlement 
is not a “durable solution” unless it “offers refugees the support and 
opportunities to facilitate their integration into their new commu-
nity.”91 
 
                                                      
86 Lillie Dremeaux, ‘The Way People Look at Us Has Changed’: Muslim Women on 
Life in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2016, at A6.  But see Pfeffer supra note 54, at 49 
(explaining the differences between integration and assimilation). 
87 ALBA & FONER, supra note 60, at 229–31 (“How much national philosophies, 
cultures, or models of integration matter for the actual integration of immigrants 
and minorities is debatable.”). 
88 Id.  (alluding to the stratified structure of the educational system in Ger-
many, and the “second-generation disadvantage” present in the American educa-
tional system, as examples of institutional obstacles to integration). 
89 See BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 4 (maintaining that immigration policies 
influence immigrants’ understandings of citizenship); MOTOMURA, supra note 2, at 
188 (commenting that “the role of race and ethnicity in U.S. immigration and citi-
zenship law” results in many immigrants and their U.S. born descendants feeling 
unwelcome and “less than fully American”); Aleinikoff & Rumbaut, supra note 2, 
at 2 (hypothesizing that “the way people are invited or welcomed to become mem-
bers of the society influences their joining behavior . . . .”). 
90 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration of Resettled Refugees, supra note 
7, at 6.  Ruud Lubbers, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees at the time, stated 
that the “UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection calls upon states to put in place policies 
to ensure that resettlement runs in tandem with a vigorous integration policy.”  Id. 
91 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Resettlement Handbook, supra note 27, at 7. 
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3.1.3.  Integration in Canada   
 
Many of the governments of UNHCR resettlement states have 
adopted specific or overarching policies of refugee integration.92  
Canada is among them.  A primary goal of Canada’s 2001 Immigra-
tion and Refugee Protection Act  is to promote the successful inte-
gration of refugees and other immigrants.93  In addition, Canada’s 
federal immigration and citizenship agency established a 2016-17 
goal that “newcomers and citizens participate in fostering an inte-
grated society.”94 
                                                      
92 See, e.g., SARAH SPENCER, THE MIGRATION OBSERVATORY, POLICY PRIMER: 
INTEGRATION, 2 (2011) (highlighting the United Kingdom’s adoption of a “Refugee 
Integration Strategy” in 2000). 
93 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 § 3(1)(e) (Can.) 
(stating the objective “to promote the successful integration of permanent residents 
into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for 
new immigrants and Canadian society.”). 
94 IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP CANADA, REPORT ON PLANS AND 
PRIORITIES 2016 -17.  The European Union has also adopted integration standards 
for all immigrants.  See Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs 
Press Release 14615/04  (Nov. 19, 2004), reaffirmed by Council of the European Un-
ion, Justice and Home Affairs, Council Conclusions of the Council and the Repre-
sentatives of the Member State on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals Le-
gally Residing in the EU (June 5-6, 2014).  German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s 
Cabinet approved measures in May 2016 to help migrants become “good neighbors 
and citizens.”  Measures included “an understanding of and compliance with the 
principles of living together in our society and compliance with our laws are essen-
tial for successful integration.”  David Rising & Frank Jordans, German Officials OK 
Plan for Migrant Influx, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, May 26, 2016, at A4. 
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While direct comparisons are fraught with difficulty because of 
different national histories, norms, and conditions, Canada’s expe-
rience with integration is notable.95  Many view Canada as a success-
ful model of migrant integration.96  Since 1971, Canada has inten-
tionally crafted an identity as a pluralistic, multi-cultural society.97 
Canada’s official policy of multiculturalism reflects the ethos of 
integration.  It seeks to create a climate of mutual respect for differ-
ent cultures nested within a cohesive Canadian identity.98  Integra-
tion of refugees and other immigrants is one of the initiatives in the 
                                                      
95 Some authors suggest that comparison of immigration policies and out-
comes between the United States and Canada is appropriate.  Both are considered 
nations of immigrants.  ALBA & FONER, supra note 60, at 223; BLOEMRAAD, supra note 
55, at 8.  Both are liberal welfare states.  Id.  Both share similar approaches to natu-
ralization.  Id.  at 18-19.  And, both adopted exclusionary immigration policies in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Id. at 8.  Yet some suggest that 
Canada’s selective immigration policies favoring skilled workers render compari-
son less relevant. ALBA & FONER, supra note 60, at 233.  Others disagree, maintaining 
that the impact of Canada’s system of evaluating a potential immigrant’s job skills, 
language ability and other characteristics is exaggerated.  BLOEMRAAD, supra note 
55, at 41. 
96 See ALBA & FONER, supra note 60, at 3 and 224 (noting that Canada is often 
touted as a model of successful integration, but also that no country is completely 
successful in every domain of integration). 
97 See JONATHAN TEPPERMAN, THE FIX: HOW NATIONS SURVIVE AND THRIVE IN A 
WORLD IN DECLINE 54-55 (2016) (describing the context of Prime Minister Pierre Tru-
deau’s speech before parliament in which he announced Canada’s multicultural-
ism, and later created a new Ministry of Multiculturalism).  The Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, enacted in 1982, provides that the Charter “shall be inter-
preted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the mul-
ticultural heritage of Canadians.”  Constitution Act, 1982, Pt. I, s. 27 being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II, no 44 (Can.). 
98 See John W. Berry & Feng Hou, Immigrant Acculturation and Wellbeing in Can-
ada, 57 CAN. PSYCHOL. 254 (2016) (indicating that a goal of Canada’s multicultural-
ism is to accept that “individuals can be proud of and feel attached to both their 
heritage cultures and to Canada.”); see also MICHAEL DEWING, LIBRARY OF 
PARLIAMENT, PUBL’N NO. 2009-20-E, CANADIAN MULTICULTURALISM (2013), 
https://bdp.parl.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2009-20-e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/75GY-TBVB] (detailing Canada’s institutionalization of multi-
culturalism as official federal policy). 
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multiculturalism framework.99  This process, consistent with defini-
tions of integration set forth earlier, “is a two-way street; an accom-
modation between newcomers and Canadians.”100 
Rather than accentuating national security concerns, Canadians 
view refugee and immigration policy as one of state building.  As 
Canada’s former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration stated, 
“Why keep [migrants] as permanent tenants, when they could be 
encouraged to become landlords of their adopted country?”101  Pol-
icy makers view integration as a way to prevent ethnic groups from 
becoming marginalized and a potentially destabilizing element in 
society.102 
Federal and provincial governments support resident newcom-
ers broadly, not just refugees.103  This support includes orientation 
services about life in Canada (both overseas, for refugees and other 
immigrants en route to Canada, and within Canada);104 language 
                                                      
99 See Marchi, supra note 6, at 24 (“In Canada, as a matter of public policy, the 
federal government makes a focused and deliberate effort towards the integration 
of newcomers”); see also Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 526 
(stating that integration is the only means of acculturation that requires both host 
and migrant adaptation). 
100 Marchi, supra note 6, at 24. 
101 Id. at 23.  Marchi was not speaking solely of refugee integration, but of in-
tegrating all migrants. 
102 See id. (noting that marginalization of immigrants undermines their contri-
butions and can eventually lead to social inequalities with potentially destabilizing 
effects). 
103 Soojin Yu et al., Refugee Integration in Canada: A Survey of Empirical Evidence 
and Existing Services, 24 REFUGE: CANADA’S J. ON REFUGEES 17, 23-25 (2007) (describ-
ing employment workshops, language training, and social support services that are 
available to refugees and other immigrants but exclude applicants for asylum in 
some areas). 
104 The Canadian Orientation Abroad (“COA”) program is funded by Can-
ada’s federal Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada and implemented by 
the International Organization for Migration (“IOM”).  COA claims that its three-
day pre-arrival orientation program for resettled refugees “is the largest pre-arrival 
orientation program presented by IOM, closely followed by the United States Cul-
tural Orientation program.”  About COA, CANADIAN ORIENTATION ABROAD, 
http://www.coa-oce.ca/our-work/about-coa/ [https://perma.cc/Q5PZ-Q73J] 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2017).  One of the program’s objectives is to “[p]rovide infor-
mation regarding rights and freedoms, responsibilities, and obligations as Perma-
nent Residents.”  Canadian Orientation Abroad, GOV’T OF CAN., 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/partner/bpss/COA.asp 
[https://perma.cc/9HWC-EKWR] (last modified Apr. 25, 2016).  While COA does 
not define “largest,” it operates training for refugees from seventeen permanent 
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training in English and French; employment services; and commu-
nity connections programs that help immigrants access services and 
build networks with Canadians and established immigrants.105  
Government-sponsored refugees receive up to one year of income 
support for shelter, food, and incidentals.106  Canada also allows pri-
vate groups and community organizations to sponsor refugees 
through a program created in 1979.107  Privately-sponsored refugees 
are entitled generally to one year of support from their sponsors.108 
A large majority of foreign-born residents have acquired Cana-
dian citizenship, unlike in the United States.109  While the data may 
                                                      
locations and serves over thirty countries with mobile trainers.  The more decen-
tralized U.S. cultural orientation program is offered only in nine Resettlement Sup-
port Centers globally and is staffed mostly by different nongovernmental organi-
zations.  Who We Serve, CULTURAL ORIENTATION RESOURCE EXCHANGE, 
http://coresourceexchange.org/about/who-we-serve/ 
[https://perma.cc/DKV4-CEXP] (last visited Feb. 11, 2017). 
105 See How Canada’s Refugee System Works, GOV’T OF CAN., 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/canada.asp [https://perma.cc/3ERT-
7X5L] (last modified Apr. 3, 2017) (addressing support for “all newcomers”); see also 
Yu, et al., supra note 103, at 25 (describing federal and provincial support to connect 
refugees with members of their host communities). 
106 How Canada’s Refugee System Works, GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 105.  Canada 
utilizes two processes for admitting refugees from overseas.  Government-assisted 
refugees are referred by UNHCR and receive support from federal programs.  Pri-
vately-sponsored refugees are supported by private, voluntary groups. Yu et al., 
supra note 103, at 18. 
107 Canadian visa authorities determine the eligibility of refugees to enter the 
country through this program, often in conjunction with UNHCR.  Guide to the Pri-
vate Sponsorship of Refugees Program, GOV’T OF CAN. 2.6, http://www.cic.gc.ca/eng-
lish/resources/publications/ref-sponsor/section-2.asp [https://perma.cc/LRQ5-
PC6P] (last modified May 17, 2017); see also Johanna Reynolds & Jennifer Hyndman, 
A Turn in Canadian Refugee Policy and Practice, 16 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. 41, 
44 (2015) (detailing recent changes and conditions of the Private Sponsorship Pro-
gram).  For an anecdotal review of Canada’s program of privately sponsoring ref-
ugees, see Jodi Kantor & Catrin Einhorn, Refugees Encounter a Foreign Word: Welcome, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/world/amer-
icas/canada-syrian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/XF3J-RFRY]. 
108 Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 
107. 
109 See BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 2–3 (reporting on a 2001 census that indi-
cated that seventy-two percent of foreign-born residents had acquired Canadian 
citizenship, almost double the proportion in the United States, and noting that the 
proportion of foreign-born residents acquiring Canadian citizenship  has increased 
since the Canadian government began to pursue multiculturalism in the 1970’s).  
Over twenty percent of Canada’s residents are foreign-born.  Id. at 49. 
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not be entirely comparable, it appears that refugees, specifically, nat-
uralize at a higher rate in Canada compared to the rate of refugee 
naturalization in the United States.110 
Moreover, two thirds of Canadians view immigration as one of 
Canada’s “key positive features.”111  In a comparison of Canadian 
and U.S. immigrant integration, one author concludes that Canada’s 
high levels of political incorporation of immigrants is due to the wel-
coming reception that host communities extend to newcomers, 
shaped by the government’s multicultural policies and integration 
measures112  Empirical research indicates that immigrant integra-
tion—in which newcomers retain a strong sense of belonging to 
their heritage culture and to Canada—results in a greater level of 
immigrant wellbeing.113 
Refugees in Canada still struggle with the difficult process of in-
tegration.114  But many policy makers, citizens, and refugees suggest 
                                                      
110 Compare GARNETT PICOT & FENG HOU, STAT. CAN., 11F0019M NO. 338, 
DIVERGENT TRENDS IN CITIZENSHIP RATES AMONG IMMIGRANTS IN CANADA AND THE 
UNITED STATES (2011), 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11f0019m/11f0019m2011338-eng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MG3N-88DG] (highlighting that eighty-five percent of refugees 
entering Canada in the early 1990s became citizens within six to ten years, though 
it is not clear whether this figure includes only refugees resettled from outside of 
Canada, or also those who entered Canada and successfully claimed asylum) with 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV.’S, TRENDS IN NATURALIZATION RATES: FY 2014 
UPDATE (2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports/Trends-in-Naturalization-Rates-FY14-
Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB8Z-FBHC] (indicating that in the United States, 
70.6 per cent of refugees admitted in 1994 and asylees who gained lawful perma-
nent residency status that year became citizens by 2004); see also U.N. High Comm’r 
for Refugees, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, at 27 (2015), 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-
trends-2015.html [https://perma.cc/LLJ5-R4QW] (reporting that, while data may 
be incomplete, Canada reported the largest number of naturalized refugees in the 
world in 2015, with about 25,900, or eighty-one percent, of all naturalized refugees 
worldwide). 
111 TEPPERMAN, supra note 97, at 49.  A 2006 national poll of Canadians revealed 
that multiculturalism policies were more important to Canadian identity than 
hockey.  Id. at 63. 
112 See BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 102-03, 31–64 (addressing and discounting 
other variables, including immigrants’ attributes, country of origin, and relative 
size of immigrant streams, among others). 
113 Berry & Hou, supra note 98, at 260. 
114 See, e.g., Nimo Bokore, Documenting Refugee Stories: Resettlement and Integra-
tion Challenges of East African Refugees, 3 INT’L J. OF SOC. WORK 76, 82 (addressing 
difficulties faced by resettled refugees in Canada, including ethnic, religious, and 
racial discrimination); Yu et al., supra note 103, at 24 (reporting that the amount of 
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that material and symbolic government support for integration has 
helped to construct a pluralistic, productive, and secure polity.115  
This, however, is not the path chosen by the U.S. government. 
 
3.2.  USRAP Policy, Practice, and Flaws 
 
As a signatory of the U.N. Refugee Convention, the United 
States is obligated to cooperate with the UNHCR.  The UNHCR re-
quires states receiving resettled refugees to provide the support and 
opportunities necessary for refugees to integrate into their new com-
munities.116  Nonetheless, the U.S. refugee resettlement program 
falls substantially short of facilitating long-term integration. 
U.S. policy is not definitively set forth in any single statement or 
document.117  The lack of clarity is likely related to the fact that dif-
ferent parts of the U.S. refugee admissions and resettlement pro-
gram are managed by different federal departments.  The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (“DHS”) oversees the process of vetting 
applicants within the United States for asylum, and those outside of 
U.S. borders seeking entry as refugees.118  The Department of State 
                                                      
cash assistance provided to government assisted refugees during their first year 
does not always cover all expenses); Kantor & Einhorn, supra note 107 (identifying 
the cultural difficulties that resettled refugees face in Canada). 
115 See BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 9–10 (arguing that Canada’s policies lead 
to “a greater sense of political citizenship” on the part of immigrants); see also 
TEPPERMAN, supra note 97, at 61, 67 (describing the transformation of Canada from 
a “small, closed, ethnically homogenous state into a vibrant global powerhouse and 
one of the most open and successful multicultural nations in the world.”). 
116 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration of Resettled Refugees, supra note 
7, at 6. 
117 NEZER, supra note 8, at 14 (“The U.S. is the only major resettlement country 
in the world that does not have federal integration benchmarks.”). 
118 Screening oversees refugees referred for resettlement also involves the State 
Department.  The State Department contracts with “overseas processing entities” 
to collect biographic information. Kerwin, supra note 41, at 6.  The U.S. Customs 
and Immigration Service, a subdivision within the DHS reviews this information, 
“coordinates background checks . . . , interviews applicants, and determines eligi-
bility and admissibility.”  Id.  In addition, DHS works with the State Department to 
screen refugee applicants outside of the United States.  U.S. Refugee Admissions Pro-
gram, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/in-
dex.htm [https://perma.cc/6UJ3-6L2W]. 
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(“State Department”) manages the placement and reception of peo-
ple overseas admitted to the United States as refugees.119  The De-
partment of Health and Human Services provides limited cash, 
medical, and other assistance to refugees newly resettled in the 
United States.120  In addition, the assistance provided to refugees 
once they arrive in the United States is decentralized, with much of 
the responsibility in the hands of voluntary resettlement agencies 
located throughout the country.121  These agencies use funds allo-
cated from the State Department to provide limited support for at 
least the first thirty days after a resettled refugee arrives in  the 
United States.122  Agency volunteers or staff typically meet resettled 
refugees at the airport and take them to pre-arranged housing.123  
Agency case managers work to help address the most basic needs of 
refugees directly after arrival. 
Of the various offices within the three federal agencies tasked 
with working with refugees either bound for or within the United 
States, only one includes a mission statement that mentions integra-
tion.  The Office of Refugee Resettlement, located within the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, states that its mission is to pro-
vide “people in need with critical resources to assist them in 
                                                      
119 The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (“PRM”), organized 
within the State Department, helps to collect and evaluate applications for refugee 
status from outside of the United States and operates the Reception and Placement 
Program.  U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 118. 
120 The Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettle-
ment works through state governments and nongovernmental organizations to 
provide cash and medical assistance, as well as language, employment, and social 
services.  Refugees, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.’S, 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/refugees [https://perma.cc/N2AB-RDF7] (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2017). 
121 The State Department’s Reception and Placement program works with nine 
nongovernmental domestic resettlement agencies to place refugees in about 190 
communities throughout the United States and provides refugees with support 
during their first one to three months.  The Reception and Placement Program, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/in-
dex.htm [https://perma.cc/9HKD-QVVL] (last visited Feb. 20, 2017). 
122 The program provides funding to agencies on a per capita basis that is used 
towards meeting the refugees’ immediate needs on arrival.  Id. 
123 NEZER, supra note 8, at 6 (detailing the activities and services conducted by 
voluntary agencies, known as “volags,” to aid incoming refugees). 
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becoming integrated members of American society.”124  Beyond this 
brief mention, there is no definition of what it means to be an inte-
grated member of American society, and there are neither any strat-
egies provided to achieve integration nor indicators given to meas-
ure integration.125 
The text of the 1980 Refugee Act does not expressly identify any 
specific policy guiding refugee resettlement efforts.  In enacting the 
1980 Refugee Act, Congress was more concerned with replacing the 
prior ad hoc entrance procedure with a comprehensive structure for 
the overseas admission of refugees into the United States.126  The le-
gal framework of the Act establishes programs to enhance the eco-
nomic self-sufficiency of refugees.  Rather than constructing a pol-
icy, the Refugee Act calls for the President to appoint a Coordinator 
for Refugee Affairs, who is tasked with developing an “overall 
United States refugee admission and resettlement policy.”127  The 
legislation charges the Coordinator, an Ambassador-at-Large, with 
coordinating U.S. domestic and international refugee admission and 
resettlement programs.128  There apparently has not been an Ambas-
sador-at-Large serving as Coordinator for Refugee Affairs since Feb-
ruary 1993.129 
                                                      
124 What We Do, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.’S, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/C6PT-
VQUK] (last visited Feb. 20, 2017). 
125 The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) formed an “Integration Working 
Group” in June 2006 to analyze refugee integration.  A consultant tasked with facil-
itating the working group issued a report January 2007 with a working definition 
of integration, integration indicators, and best practices related to these indicators.  
INST. FOR SOC. AND ECON. DEV., REPORT OF THE INTEGRATION WORKING GROUP (2007), 
http://ised-sow3.org.s56263.gridserver.com/sites/default/files/Re-
port%20of%20the%20IWG.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSD6-EWLU]. 
126 Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative 
History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 11 (1981–82). 
127 1980 Refugee Act, PUB. L. NO. 96–212, § 301(b)(1), 94 Stat. 102. 
128 Id. § 301(b)(2). 
129 U.S. Ambassador at Large, NNDB, 
http://www.nndb.com/gov/539/000121176/ [https://perma.cc/8QTD-RQ83] 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (indicating that Jewel S. Lafontant, who ended her term 
in Februrary of 1993, was the last Coordinator for Refugee Affairs).  Currently, the 
PRM Director is also Deputy Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. OFFICE OF THE 
HISTORIAN, Assistant Secretaries of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration Affairs, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/princi-
palofficers/assistant-secretary-for-population-refugees-migration 
[https://perma.cc/X5WJ-X72P] (last visited Feb. 20, 2017). 
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As a 1983 Government Accounting Office report concluded: 
[i]mplementation of the [1980 Refugee Act’s] legislative 
mandate requiring the Coordinator to develop an overall 
U.S. refugee admission and resettlement policy has proved 
to be extremely difficult and controversial.  Overall, interpre-
tation of policymaking responsibilities remains an issue of 
contention between the Coordinator’s Office and the Federal 
agencies charged with program implementation.  Also, the 
Office lacks the authority and resources to implement or en-
force policy.130 
If there is a singular objective that drives U.S. refugee resettle-
ment, it could be summarized as rapid economic self-sufficiency.  
While not enunciated as a policy framework, the goal to situate ref-
ugees in the workplace as soon as possible seems to drive U.S. reset-
tlement efforts.  This is evident in legislation, as well as Executive 
Branch strategy.131 
The 1980 Refugee Act emphasizes speedy economic self-suffi-
ciency.132  The section on assistance to refugees begins with calling 
for “sufficient resources for employment training and placement in 
order to achieve economic self-sufficiency among refugees as 
quickly as possible.”133  Federal regulations define economic self-
                                                      
130 Samuel W. Bowlin, Assoc. Dir., Nat’l Sec. and Int’l Affairs Div., Role of the 
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Immi-
gration, Refugees and International Law House Judiciary Committee (June 22, 
1983). 
131 See Harris, supra note 43, at 41, 83–84 (discussing the 1980 Refugee Act’s 
focus on rapid job acquisition and “effective resettlement”); see also Paul Kenny & 
Kate Lockwood-Kenny, A Mixed Blessing: Karen Resettlement to the United States, 24 
J. REFUGEE STUD. 217, 225 (2011) (noting that “[s]elf-sufficiency has always been the 
cornerstone of the US resettlement policy”); Kerwin, supra note 41, at 10 (stating 
that “early self-sufficiency through employment represents a core programme 
goal.”). 
132 The Act initially, and as amended, also addresses opportunities for English 
language training “in nonwork hours where possible.”  Immigration and National-
ity Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2017).  The Act also authorizes medical assis-
tance, if such assistance will encourage economic self-sufficiency or avoid signifi-
cant burdens on a state.  Id. § 1522(e)(5)(A). 
133 1980 Refugee Act, supra note 127, § 1522(a)(1)(A); Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, supra note 132, § 1522(a)(1)(A) (2017). 
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sufficiency as earnings sufficient to support a family without receiv-
ing cash assistance.134 
In addition, the arm of the State Department tasked with refugee 
resettlement emphasizes work, encouraging employment as soon as 
possible.135  The Department of Health and Human Services, Office 
of Refugee Resettlement stresses the importance of work as well.136  
Local refugee resettlement agencies help to carry out the rapid em-
ployment mandate by assisting newly-arrived refugees with enrol-
ling in employment services.137  Even the English-language classes 
to which state agencies refer refugees concentrate instruction on vo-
cabulary for particular, low-skill jobs.138 
The prioritization of rapid employment assumes that participa-
tion in the labor force as quickly as possible is the best way for refu-
                                                      
134 45 C.F.R. § 400.2 (2017) (defining cash assistance as: “financial assistance to 
refugees, including TANF, SSI, refugee cash assistance, and general assistance, as 
defined herein, under title IV of the Act.”). 
135 The Reception and Placement Program within the State Department’s Bu-
reau of Population, Refugees and Migration states: “Refugees receive employment 
authorization upon arrival and are encouraged to become employed as soon as pos-
sible.  Based on years of experience, the U.S. refugee resettlement program has 
found that people learn English and begin to function comfortably much faster if 
they start work soon after arrival.  Most refugees begin in entry-level jobs, even if 
they have high-level skills or education.  With time, many if not most refugees move 
ahead professionally and find both success and satisfaction in the United States.” 
Reception and Placement Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X2GN-2UX6] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017). 
136 The Office of Refugee Resettlement’s Division of Refugee Assistance’s mis-
sion statement indicates that “DRA [Division of Refugee Assistance] provides di-
rection to States to ensure that refugees are provided assistance and services 
through State-administered programs that enable them to become employed and 
economically self-sufficient as soon as possible after their arrival in the United 
States.” Divisions – Refugee Assistance, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.’S (Oct. 
3, 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/divisions-refugee-assistance 
[https://perma.cc/8RLD-ASAP]. 
137 See, e.g., WORLD RELIEF SPOKANE, https://worldreliefspokane.org/refugee-
resettlement [https://perma.cc/44AU-CUA8] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017) (stating 
that staff and volunteers assist refugees with enrolling in employment services). 
138 See, e.g., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOCIAL & HEALTH SERV.’S, REPORT TO THE 
LEGISLATURE: REFUGEE AND IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT SERVICES: LIMITED ENGLISH 
PROFICIENT (LEP) PATHWAY AND BASIC FOOD EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING (BFET), 4, 
10 (2015) (stating that “LEP  Pathway’s  ESL  services  provide  participants  with  
work-related English language training to enhance their employability” and indi-
cating that refugees receiving TANF or Refugee Cash Assistance are referred to this 
program). 
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gees to successfully resettle in the United States.  Through work, ref-
ugees are said to improve English language skills, gain familiarity 
with U.S. customs, and enhance economic self-sufficiency.139 
This focus on speedy economic self-sufficiency through employ-
ment is consistent with a market-based approach to social welfare.  
The United States has long opted to privatize many social benefits 
by transferring responsibility for basic social welfare to employ-
ers.140  In the 1980s, neoliberal champions of fiscal austerity and free 
markets reformed or eliminated governmental social welfare pro-
grams based on the assumption that markets would maximize social 
well-being.141  The Refugee Act, adopted as neoliberalism began to 
take root among U.S. policy makers, followed suit by authorizing 
minimal governmental support for refugees and steering newcom-
ers into the labor market as soon as possible.142 
A market-based system of social welfare conveys the misleading 
message that if a person invests labor in the market economy, soci-
ety will provide the broader conditions for prosperity and dignity.143  
                                                      
139 See Bill Ong Hing, Providing a Second Chance, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1893, 1898 
(2007) (quoting a 1993 vision statement from the director of the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement that touts the benefits of rapid employment). 
140 Maria L. Ontiveros, The Myths of Market Forces, Mothers, and Private Employ-
ment: The Parental Leave Veto, 1 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 49 (1992) (stating that 
“our society has chosen the workplace to deliver social welfare benefits.”). 
141 See Mimi Abramovitz, Neither Accidental, Nor Simply Mean-Spirited: The Con-
text for Welfare Reform, in THE PROMISE OF WELFARE REFORM: POLITICAL RHETORIC AND 
THE REALITY OF POVERTY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 23, 26–27 (Keith M. Kilty & 
Elizabeth A. Segal, eds., 2006) (discussing the rise of neoliberalism and its tenets); 
see also Mitchell Dean, Rethinking Neoliberalism, 50 J. OF SOC. 150, 157 (2012) (noting 
the prominence of neoliberalism beginning in the late 1970s). 
142 In this regard, refugees join impoverished Americans pushed into the low 
wage labor market as a supposed panacea.  Welfare benefits have consistently been 
low enough to impose a work requirement for survival, but the 1996 Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act imposed a strict work re-
quirement, sanctioning individuals and states that failed to comply.  Nice, supra 
note 10, at 63–64. 
143 See LAUREN BERLANT, THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO WASHINGTON CITY: 
ESSAYS ON SEX AND CITIZENSHIP 4 (1997) (noting “the fantasy of the American 
Dream” that “promises that if you invest your energies in work and family-making, 
the nation will secure the broader social and economic conditions in which your 
labor can gain value and your life can be lived with dignity.”); Laura R. Peck & 
Sarah Allen Gershon, Welfare Reform and the American Dream, in THE PROMISE OF 
WELFARE REFORM, supra note 141, at 97 (noting that the American Dream, which 
promises “success in exchange for hard work and honesty,” regardless of its merits, 
shapes public attitudes toward the poor). 
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For refugees, and likely other disadvantaged groups, the opposite 
may be true: these broader conditions may be a prerequisite for pro-
ductive participation in the labor market.  For example, the UNHCR 
stated in a 2016 report on refugee integration that “[s]elf-reliance 
can, however, only be achieved if there is an enabling environment.  
This includes a viable economic situation, the availability of afford-
able housing, as well as receptive attitudes within the host commu-
nity.”144 
Even if neoliberal assumptions held true in the 1980s, the nature 
of the economy and jobs has since changed dramatically.  The num-
ber of contingent workers has expanded significantly, resulting in 
less pay and leaving these workers without Social Security contribu-
tions, unemployment insurance, or workers’ compensation.145  Even 
prior advocates of neoliberal economic philosophy have concluded 
since the financial crisis of 2008 that austerity and market-oriented 
policies have exacerbated economic inequality.146  Despite recent 
discrediting of neoliberalism in general, and longstanding criticism 
that the U.S. refugee resettlement program has lacked proper fund-
ing and coordination, change appears unlikely.147 
                                                      
144 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration - A Fundamental Component, su-
pra note 66, at 2. 
145 See Contingent Workers, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/reich/reports/dunlop/sec-
tion5.htm [https://perma.cc/3D9K-MG6S] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
146 Rick Rowden, The IMF Confronts Its N-Word: The International Monetary Fund 
Admits that it’s Time to Discard Some of the Old Neoliberal Dogmas, FOREIGN POLICY 
(July 6, 2016, 3:22 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/06/the-imf-confronts-
its-n-word-neoliberalism/ [https://perma.cc/58K7-TSRN] (discussing the Inter-
national Monetary Fund’s acknowledgement that the organization had historically 
oversold the benefits of fiscal austerity and noting that this acknowledgment re-
flects a reckoning with “the failure of 30 years of neoliberal policies to bring about 
financial stability or lessen widening economic divides.”). 
147 There was some indication in 2015 that federal agencies were ready to ex-
pand beyond a limited economic self-sufficiency objective.  A White House task 
force on “New Americans” published in April 2015 a “strategic action plan on im-
migrant and refugee integration.”  THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON NEW 
AMERICANS, STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES BY WELCOMING ALL RESIDENTS: A 
FEDERAL STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN ON IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE INTEGRATION (2015) 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/fi-
nal_tf_newamericans_report_4-14-15_clean.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL24-PHN4].  
This interdepartmental task force included representation from the agencies in-
volved in USRAP, as well as other federal agencies and offices.  The plan identified 
five goals to strengthen the “integration pillars” of civic, economic, and linguistic 
integration.  Even prior to the election of President Trump, it was not clear that the 
recommendations of the task force would have resulted in a policy of integration 
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Concern with employment and economic self-sufficiency is 
practical.  Employment is indeed correlated with more positive out-
comes for refugees.148  Ager and Strang identify employment as an 
element of integration, indicating that work is a factor in promoting 
economic independence, planning for the future, building social ties 
within the host society, developing language skills, restoring self-
esteem, and encouraging self-reliance.149  Refugees themselves want 
opportunities to contribute their skills and efforts in their new com-
munities and the ability to support themselves and their families.150 
                                                      
for refugees with strategies beyond economic self-sufficiency.  Many of the plan’s 
strategies were geared towards employment.  Moreover, the task force paid little 
attention to what some observers deem to be crucial differences between immi-
grants and refugees: immigrants voluntarily leave their home; refugees do not.  See 
Catherine Dauvergne, Informing Integration: Assessing What We Know, Admitting 
What We Don’t Know, 24 REFUGE: CAN.’S J. ON REFUGEES 14, 14–15 (2007) (pointing 
out distinctions in Canada between refugees and immigrants, arguing that it is 
shortsighted to expect the two groups to integrate in the same way, and highlight-
ing concern with integration measures that merge immigrant and refugee integra-
tion).  Accordingly, the task force did not address some of the integration domains 
that Ager and Strang identify for refugee integration, such as health, safety, and 
stability. 
148 See Kim, supra note 62, at 750–51 (noting that compared with employed ref-
ugees, refugees who were outside of the labor force had higher odds of being diag-
nosed with mood disorders); see also Rihab Mousa Yako & Bipasha Biswas, “We 
Came To This Country for the Future of Our Children.  We Have No Future”: Accultura-
tive Stress Among Iraqi Refugees in the United States, 38 INT’L J. OF INTERCULTURAL REL. 
133, 134 (2014) (concluding that unemployment increases stress, negatively impact-
ing refugees’ health). 
149 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 170.  See also FIX ET AL., supra note 2, at 2, 13, 
17 (reporting that refugee employment rates are equal to or higher than those of 
U.S. born adults but also noting lower incomes for refugee households than those 
of U.S. born households). 
150 See, e.g., GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., supra note 63, at 21 (recounting an 
Iraqi refugee couple, a physician and a veterinarian, unable to find jobs, but want-
ing to work, even at entry-level minimum wage jobs); Kenny & Lockwood-Kenny, 
supra note 131, at 228 (reporting on interviews with Karen refugees awaiting reset-
tlement as wanting to work, so that “they would be able to progress,” and quoting 
one as stating “I am looking forward to going to America because there will be good 
opportunities for us if we work hard.”); Christopher R. Lester, Jr., Refugee Educa-
tion and Economic Integration: A Qualitative Study of the United States Refugee 
Admissions Program 3 (May 28, 2014) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Central European 
University), http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2014/lester_christopher.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2S34-K5H6] (reporting that many refugees look forward to ob-
taining work and providing for their families). 
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While employment plays a role in integration, the multidimen-
sional integration process stretches well beyond speedy and mini-
mal economic self-sufficiency.151  Rapid employment may not en-
hance the long-term economic independence considered part of an 
integration policy.152  In fact, it may impair successful integration.  
This is true for at least five reasons. 
First, a rapid employment strategy fails to address barriers to 
long-term economic independence.153  Some refugees are more 
highly educated than other groups of immigrants.154  But refugees 
with skills, expertise or professional education find that their quali-
                                                      
151 See Harris, supra note 43, at 43 (asserting that “integration is much more 
than ‘economic self-sufficiency’”).  A UNHCR definition of integration indicates 
that “self-reliance is but one part” of an integration process.  U.N. High Comm’r for 
Refugees, Integration – A Fundamental Component, supra note 66, at 1.  A UNHCR 
research report states that integration is a process related to, “but also to be distin-
guished from, self reliance.”  Rosa da Costa, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Rights 
of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations, at 8, 
U.N. Doc. POLAS/2006/02 (June 2006), http://www.unhcr.org/44bb90882.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H5Z8-QQL5].  In addition, the UNHCR asserts that “[i]ntegrat-
ing refugees goes beyond ensuring that they are provided with basic needs and 
access to services.”  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration of Resettled Refugees, 
supra note 7, at 8. 
152 See Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 170–71 (discussing the domain of “em-
ployment,” including the problem of underemployment because of work that is 
mismatched with a refugee’s skills and the need for vocational training education 
to foster employability).  Rather than representing a path to prosperity, a narrow 
focus on economic self-sufficiency through rapid employment “undermines long 
term integration and resettlement success” for refugees.  Harris, supra, note 43, at 
82. 
153 See Liz Alderman, Guiding Refugees in Europe on a Rocky Path to Assimilation, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2016 (reporting on barriers to employment faced by refugees in 
Europe and private initiatives to help clear those barriers).  See also Harris, supra 
note 43, at 58. 
154 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 170. 
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fications are not transferable, or require a lengthy and costly recerti-
fication or recredentialing process.155  Accordingly, they take “sur-
vival jobs” that hinder prospects for long-term economic stability.156  
In addition, the narrow rapid employment objective neglects the im-
pact that housing has on the ability to secure employment.  The 
housing that resettlement agencies select for refugees is often lo-
cated in dangerous areas, far from work opportunities.157  Moreover, 
                                                      
155 See Harris, supra note 43, at 55–59.  Ives, supra note 53, at 58–59.  Rebecca 
Joie Habeeb-Silva, Resettlement Challenges for Refugees in the United States 31–32 
(June 2016) (unpublished M.S.W. thesis, California State University, San Bernar-
dino), http://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1321&con-
text=etd [https://perma.cc/MS7L-2RVD] (recounting from interviews with an 
Iraqi refugee family frustration at the inability to transfer college degrees or credit 
from completed college courses. Quoting also an Afghan refugee who had worked 
with USAID in Afghanistan, with over 13 years of management experience and ge-
ographical information mapping skills, unable to secure employment in his field 
and instead worked as a security guard). 
156 COLUMBIA UNIV. SCH. OF INT’L & PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 63, at 11 (noting 
that the need to secure a speedy job that often does not match a refugee’s skill set 
can prevent refugees from having time to become acclimated and access supportive 
services that could improve long-term outcomes).  See FIX ET AL., supra note 2, at 16 
(commenting on data suggesting high levels of underemployment among refugees 
with college degrees); see also Harris, supra note 43, at 29 (coining the term “survival 
jobs”); GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., supra note 63, at 25 (indicating that the em-
phasis on immediate employment incentivizes resettlement agency caseworkers to 
push Iraqi refugees into low-paying jobs, regardless of the refugee’s professional 
and educational experience).  Refugees report high levels of stress related to debts 
that accrue immediately after arrival, including repaying the travel loan extended 
to them by the International Organization for Migration that paid their transporta-
tion cost to the United States.  Habeeb-Silva, supra note 155, at 35.  See Agbényiga 
et al., supra note 48, at 317 (recounting interviews with Burundian refugees strug-
gling to secure adequate housing and food); Yako & Biswas, supra note 148, at 138 
(reporting that some Iraqi refugees arrived already carrying debt after expending 
all of their resources waiting in a country of first asylum for resettlement). 
157 See Hing, supra note 139, at 1897 (noting that “[r]esettlement efforts have led 
to tough inner-city living environments for many, where they are surrounded by 
urban crime and gang activity.”); see also, Agbényiga et al., supra note 48, at 316 
(citing refugee concerns with housing located in dangerous neighborhoods); 
COLUMBIA UNIV. SCH. OF INT’L & PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 63, at 12 (identifying the 
lack of public transportation options for many refugees from homes to job inter-
views and subsequent employment); GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., supra note 63, 
at 23 (quoting refugees who had missed job opportunities for lack of transportation 
to interviews); Kim, supra note 62, at 741 (finding that “[m]ost refugees of color are 
placed in urban areas with high poverty and poverty-related problems, and high 
rates of violence in the neighborhoods.”); Kenny & Lockwood-Kenny, supra note 
131, at 13 (reporting on the resettlement agency’s location of Karen refugees in one 
of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the city).  Refugees’ concerns regarding 
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the trauma and violence many refugees have experienced can lead 
to mental and physical health problems that, left untreated, can im-
pair a person’s ability to work.158 
Second, securing employment quickly may undermine the inte-
gration domain incorporating language and cultural knowledge.  
Weak English-language facility can prevent a refugee from attaining 
a job that matches his or her skills or abilities.159  Yet refugees receiv-
ing temporary state or federal assistance may be required to take one 
or more low-paying jobs as a condition of such assistance, often pre-
venting their attendance at ESL classes because of long hours and 
extensive commutes.160  Without sufficient English-language skills, 
                                                      
the safety and location of housing echo longstanding concerns of poor people in 
general and the substandard housing to which they are relegated. 
158 Harris, supra note 43, at 58, n.101.  Federal Refugee Medical Assistance ex-
pires eight months after arrival in the United States.  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERV.’S, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ORR INDICATORS FOR REFUGEE 
RESETTLEMENT STAKEHOLDERS 21 (2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/orr/508_compliant_fy_2016_orr_indicators_for_refugee_resettle-
ment.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBC6-NCSE].  Thereafter, refugees who meet income 
criteria are eligible for Medicaid under the Affordable Healthcare Act.  Id.  Access 
to healthcare and clinical resources for refugees varies among states.  Refugee Health, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.’S,  https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/pro-
grams/refugee-health [https://perma.cc/N2AB-RDF7] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).  
Culturally appropriate mental health care is scarce.  See CONTINUITY OF RISK, supra 
note 62, at 23 (identifying a lack of “culturally and linguistically appropriate and 
affordable mental health services as a critical, unmet need” in a study of Congolese 
refugee women); Kenny & Lockwood-Kenny, supra note 131, at 9 (noting that the 
requirement to find a job soon after arrival does not give refugees time to recover 
from any traumas they have experienced). 
159 Ives, supra note 53, at 58 (reporting on results of a study of Bosnian refugees 
resettled in the United States and concluding that they lacked access to intensive 
English language programs that could “enable them to move from manual labor . . . 
to better paying jobs more in line with their skill sets obtained in Bosnia.”). 
160 See Harris, supra note 43, at 34, 61; see also Ives supra note 53, at 60 (reporting 
that refugees are essentially trapped in low-wage jobs “because of either no in-
volvement in English courses due to immediate job obligations or involvement in 
courses that are geared toward minimum-wage work.”); Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, supra note 132, § 1522 (e)(2)(A) (2017) (conditioning temporary cash assis-
tance to refugees on a refugee’s registration with an employment service agency 
and acceptance of “appropriate offers of employment.”).  See, e.g., Habeeb-Silva, 
supra note 155, at 36–67 (quoting an Iraqi refugee father lamenting that his sons 
became ineligible for assistance when they enrolled in community college rather 
than working). 
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refugees cannot advance beyond the low-paying jobs that initially 
interrupted their ESL classes.161 
Third, immediate participation in the labor force can interfere 
with building the social bonds and social bridges that play a signif-
icant role in refugee health and feelings of being settled.162  Long 
hours devoted to work soon after arrival prevent establishing social 
connections.163  As the UNHCR has concluded, “the time-limited fo-
cus on employment and self-sufficiency appears to overshadow the 
benefits of meaningful interpersonal interactions that include strong 
social and emotional support.”164 
Fourth, the economic self-sufficiency emphasis fails to consider 
the host community into which refugees are resettled—the other 
side of the integration equation.  As integration definitions indicate, 
a host community and its institutions should be willing to meet the 
needs of a diverse population.  With limited federal resources di-
rected primarily at securing jobs for refugees, there is little or no as-
sistance for facilitating interaction between refugees and their new 
communities.  Communities that have received a proportionately 
                                                      
161 See CONTINUITY OF RISK, supra note 62, at 30 (discussing that the Congolese 
women refugees interviewed “reported ceasing to attend ESL classes as soon as 
they started working, which, for some, was as early as 6 weeks post-arrival in the 
US.  Women cited a lack of evening ESL classes and difficulties with transportation, 
as well as not having enough energy or time, as their primary reasons for dropping 
out of ESL classes.”); see also FIX ET AL., supra note 2 at 15 (noting that a large per-
centage of adult refugees are unable to speak English well even after years of resi-
dence, despite also concluding that half of refugees are employed within eight 
months of arrival). 
162 See Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 178, 180 (addressing the import and 
benefits of social connections); see also Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra 
note 58, and accompanying text (describing the positive impact of social connec-
tions on refugees).  See, e.g., CONTINUITY OF RISK, supra note 62, at 26, 31 (addressing 
the isolation that Congolese women refugees reported and citing the barriers of 
work schedules and demands and concluding that Congolese women refugees with 
children needed more time and support before they could be expected to be self-
sufficient). 
163 See Sungkyu Lee et al., Community Integration of Burmese Refugees in the 
United States, 6 ASIAN AM. J. OF PSYCHOL. 333, 338 (2015) (finding that long work 
hours may inhibit community integration). 
164 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration – A Fundamental Component, 
supra note 66, at 3 (referring to a UNHCR-supported research report, The Continu-
ity of Risk: A Three-City Study of Congolese Women-at-Risk Resettled in the U.S.); 
see also Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 540 (concluding that 
social connections helped “facilitate access to the wide range of support that refu-
gees needed to move their lives forward”). 
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large number of refugees, without sufficient federal support, are in-
creasingly resistant to refugee resettlement and likely disinclined to 
build bridges with an unwanted community.165 
Finally, on a more abstract level, stressing economic self-suffi-
ciency through rapid employment does refugees and host societies 
a disservice by perpetuating a narrative of refugees as welfare de-
pendents.166  Indeed, consistent with neoliberal philosophy, the 
amended Refugee Act specifically instructs local resettlement agen-
cies to adopt criteria “to reduce welfare dependency among refu-
gees resettled by that agency.”167  The pervasive characterization of 
resettled refugees as “the ‘needy’ other”168 not only marginalizes ref-
ugees but also prevents resettlement communities from capitalizing 
on the potential economic, social, and cultural contributions that ref-
ugees can offer.169 
                                                      
165 See NEZER, supra note 8, at 10–13 (reporting on local resistance to refugee 
resettlement); ABANDONED UPON ARRIVAL, supra note 8, at 2–3 (suggesting that low 
levels of federal assistance harm resettlement communities as well as refugees).  
States have expressed concern about accepting refugees in light of limited federal 
funds.  FIX ET AL., supra note 2 at 19 (reporting that in 2016, four states announced 
an intent to withdraw from the state-administered part of the federal refugee reset-
tlement program). 
166 This narrative has permeated U.S. immigration laws since their inception.  
See MOTOMURA, supra note 2, at 47 (recounting federal immigration laws since 1883 
excluding immigrants likely to become public charges, and referring to state exclu-
sions prior to the rise of federal law); see also FIX ET AL., supra note 2, at 20 (conclud-
ing that “perceptions of slow refugee integration, high benefit use rates, and low 
employment levels have not, in general, been supported by the evidence” from a 
study of five refugee nationalities in four states). 
167 Immigration & Nationality Act, supra note 132, § 1522(b)(8)(A) (2017).  See 
also id. § 1522(a)(2)(C)(iii)(III) (cautioning that assistance to refugees should not pro-
mote long-term dependence on public assistance). 
168 See Tyeklar, supra note 44, at 153, 162 (noting that U.S. resettlement agencies 
commonly represent refugees as “the ‘needy’ other.”). 
169 Harris, supra, note 43, at 43.  For example, roughly forty-five percent of For-
tune 500 companies were established by immigrants or their children.  PARTNERSHIP 
FOR A NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, THE “NEW AMERICAN” FORTUNE 500 11 (June 2011), 
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/new-ameri-
can-fortune-500-june-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRC6-YA9G].  While this study 
includes voluntary immigrants as well as refugees, it speaks to the human capital 
that might be squandered by a focus on rapid employment for refugees.  See, e.g., 
Anastasia Brown & Todd Scribner, Unfulfilled Promises, Future Possibilities: The Ref-
ugee Resettlement System in the United States, 2 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 101, 
110 (2014) (noting that refugees substantially contribute to local communities and 
citing a study finding that refugees contributed $48 million to the economy in 
Cleveland, Ohio); GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, supra note 63, at 26 (con-
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3.3.  Bridging the Gap 
 
A federal policy excluding refugees, with no mechanism in place 
to facilitate the integration of refugees already present in the United 
States, will not likely improve domestic security.  President Trump’s 
ban on refugees and other immigrants has fueled xenophobic and 
racist narratives and may have played a role in violent attacks 
against immigrants.170  Research has demonstrated that the climate 
of reception influences how immigrants and their children be-
have.171  The current environment of hostility and intolerance may 
only serve to promote ethnic separatism that could weaken commu-
nity safety.172 
                                                      
cluding that “modeling refugee assistance on anti-poverty programs is mis-
guided”); Brown & Scribner, supra note 169, at 108–09 (asserting that associating 
refugee assistance with a form of welfare has altered how segments of the American 
public perceive resettled refugees). 
170 See Janice Williams, Under Trump Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Have Increased at 
an Alarming Rate, NEWSWEEK (July 17, 2017, 6:05 PM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/hate-crime-america-muslims-trump-638000 
[https://perma.cc/5VS7-EURH] (recounting a 91% increase in reported hate-
crimes against Muslims in the first half of 2017 compared to the same period in 
2016, with many said to be triggered by the victim’s national origin).  See, e.g., Sandi 
Doughton, FBI Aids in Investigation into Shooting of Sikh Man in Kent, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Mar. 5, 2017, 12:11 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/fbi-
aids-in-investigation-into-shooting-of-sikh-man-in-kent/ 
[https://perma.cc/GAD8-5CRB] (reporting that the victim of a shooting, a U.S. cit-
izen originally from India, claimed his assailant told him to “go back to your own 
country”); Liam Stack, F.B.I. Investigating Kansas Shooting of Indian Men as Hate 
Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/02/28/us/kansas-shooting-indians-fbi.html 
[https://perma.cc/AVR6-HFTB] (indicating that the F.B.I. is investigating as a hate 
crime the shooting of two Indian immigrants by a white assailant who questioned 
their immigration status and issued ethnic slurs before firing shots); see also Türk, 
supra note 5, at 4 (noting “a proliferation of xenophobic narratives” in some coun-
tries that has led to attacks against refugees). 
171 See BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 2 (arguing that “differences in the context 
of reception [of immigrants] produce quantifiable differences in political incorpo-
ration”).  See also Aleinikoff & Rumbaut, supra note 2, at 20 (presenting survey data 
showing that groups that have found a favorable degree of reception in the United 
States were more likely to have a positive view about life in America while groups 
that are subject to racism and intolerance in the United States were less confident 
that they could ever gain acceptance). 
172 See Aleinikoff & Rumbaut, supra note 2, at 2, 19–20 (arguing that “the way 
people are invited or welcomed to become members of the society influences their 
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In the absence of a federal integration policy or strategy, local 
actors can facilitate the integration of resettled refugees and help 
counterbalance national pronouncements of exclusion.  The experi-
ences of resettled refugees around the world underscore the value 
of even small efforts in the integration process.  In describing the 
import of social connections with members of a host community, 
Ager and Strang suggest that “[s]mall acts of friendship appeared to 
have a disproportionately positive impact on perceptions.  Friendli-
ness from the settled community was very important in helping ref-
ugees feel more secure and persuading them that their presence was 
not resented.”173 
An evaluation of refugee integration projects in the United King-
dom suggests that social connections promote integration, even in 
the absence of a robust state policy or support for a two-way inte-
gration process.  Projects that have facilitated such connections have 
helped reduce isolation, lower levels of depression, and increase 
motivation among refugees.174  Notably, both refugees and members 
of host communities reported feeling safer following participation 
in projects that encouraged social interaction between the two 
groups.175 
Similarly, providing refugees with information on the laws and 
administration of justice in their new home through a community-
based forum can promote integration.176  As indicated at the begin-
ning of Section 3, such programs can strengthen the citizenship and 
                                                      
joining behavior” and adding that this conditioned behavior “influences how soci-
ety invites others to join it.”). 
173 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 180.  Along a similar vein, a Government 
Accountability Office report to the U.S. Senate that was critical of the refugee reset-
tlement program recommended federal funding to enhance community engage-
ment to increase public awareness of and interaction with refugees.  ABANDONED 
UPON ARRIVAL, supra note 8, at 6. 
174 Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 536–37.  Others under-
score the primacy of social connections.  See, e.g., BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 66 
(maintaining that immigrants are linked to the political system through social con-
nections); Agbényiga et al., supra note 48, at 308 (finding that a lack of social con-
nections decreases refugees’ well-being). 
175 Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 538. 
176 Some refugees may have been introduced to features of the U.S. legal sys-
tem prior to arriving in the United States.  After the U.S. State Department and 
Homeland Security approves a refugee’s application for resettlement to the United 
States, “most refugees undergo a brief cultural orientation course prior to departure 
for the United States.”  It appears that pre-arrival orientation is available only in 
nine locations globally.  Refugees, and Migration, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
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rights foundation on which other domains of integration rest.  By 
contributing to this foundational element, these programs indirectly 
support the other integration domains.  Moreover, because the 
workshops involve dozens of lawyers, judges, teachers, and stu-
dents, they directly help to establish the social bridges domain be-
tween refugees and the communities within which they settle.  Iron-
ically, these community-based workshops also reflect 
neoliberalism’s enthusiasm for the role of the community sector as 
an alternative to government-provided social support. 
Interactive law and justice workshops can also advance a nar-
rower policy of economic self-sufficiency.  Congress itself has un-
derscored the link between jobs and a newcomer’s understanding of 
his or her rights and responsibilities.  It adopted the Workforce In-
novation and Opportunity Act in July 2014 to increase “access to and 
opportunities for the employment, education, training, and support 
services [individuals] need to succeed in the labor market,” among 
other goals.177  A stated purpose of the legislation is to “assist immi-
grants and other individuals who are English language learners 
in . . . acquiring an understanding of the American system of Gov-
ernment, individual freedom, and the responsibilities of citizen-
ship.”178  In other words, to fully participate in the U.S. labor force, 
refugees and immigrants need to be familiar with the system of jus-
tice in the United States. 
 
4.  A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL 
 
                                                      
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/JTJ5-2WHQ] (last visited Feb. 20 2017).  At least one report has 
criticized this pre-departure orientation as insufficient.  COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 63, at 10.  Who We Are, 
CULTURAL ORIENTATION RESOURCE EXCHANGE, 
http://coresourceexchange.org/about/who-we-serve/ 
[https://perma.cc/DKV4-CEXP] (last visted Feb. 18, 2017).  Another evaluation 
noted that the program emphasizes the need to seek employment as soon as possi-
ble.  Julie M. Kornfeld, Overseas Cultural Orientation Programmes and Resettled Refu-
gees’ Perceptions, 41 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 53, 53 (2010). 
177 Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, 29 U.S.C. § 3101(1) (2015).  This 
act succeded its predecessor, the 1998 Workforce Investment Act.  See infra note 189. 
178 Id. § 3271(4)(B) (2015) (referencing the Adult Education and Literacy sub-
chapter). 
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This Section proposes that communities with sufficient re-
sources can work to provide an interactive, multicultural, and mul-
tilinguistic opportunity for refugees to learn about their legal rights 
and responsibilities in their new home.  The Section describes a col-
laborative workshop on law for refugees in Spokane, Washington as 
a possible model for other communities to follow to strengthen ref-
ugee integration. 
In Spokane and elsewhere, nonprofit organizations working 
with refugees, prosecutors, judges, police, public defenders, and ed-
ucators have recognized a need to provide information to refugees 
and immigrants about their legal rights and responsibilities and the 
system enforcing them.179 
One of the significant hurdles refugees face upon resettlement is 
society’s expectation that they comply with legal norms.  Expecting 
everyone within the borders to adhere to U.S. law is reasonable and 
necessary for public safety.  Nonetheless, many Americans who are 
citizens by birth inadvertently run afoul of unfamiliar laws.  The 
same is truer for new transplants to the United States.  Yet, as even 
many first-year law students are surprised to learn, lacking 
knowledge of a law does not make a lawbreaker less culpable. 
Breaking a law, particularly a criminal law, comes with harsh 
consequences.  The implications of merely being suspected of a 
criminal violation can be devastating.  Temporary detention can re-
sult in the loss of a job, triggering the loss of housing as well. 
The stakes are even higher for resettled refugees and other im-
migrants who have not yet gained citizenship.  As of January 2017, 
refugees and other immigrants who have not become naturalized 
citizens are given priority for removal from the United States if they 
“[h]ave committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal of-
fense,” regardless of whether they were charged or convicted, and 
irrespective of the magnitude of the offense.180 
                                                      
179 See ABANDONED UPON ARRIVAL, supra note 8, at 10 (referring to an interview 
with Nancy Chamberlin, Deputy Chief of police, during which she noted that many 
refugees are leery of police because of prior persecution in other countries and that 
some tend not to understand basic laws rooted in U.S. culture). 
180 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017).  Such proceedings 
do not mean automatic expulsion, but rather an administrative hearing to deter-
mine if a culpable refugee should be expelled.  And accusations of a violation may 
prompt a plea bargain to a lesser offense—whether committed or not—that also 
triggers removal proceedings.  In the past, violations could subject a refugee to de-
portation proceedings.  Individuals admitted as refugees who have not gained U.S. 
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There are several criminal laws that a refugee lacking familiarity 
with U.S. legal culture might inadvertently violate.  Child welfare 
laws serve as an example as illustrated by the following occurrence.  
A newly resettled couple from a refugee camp in East Africa parked 
their car in a shop’s parking lot for a quick errand.  They left their 
two children in the car with the windows open an inch or two and 
the doors unlocked.  Prosecutors charged the parents with child en-
dangerment.  While the outside temperature was about 70 degrees, 
prosecutors argued that the interior temperatures could have esca-
lated sufficiently to result in harm to the two children.  For the par-
ents, 70 degrees did not seem warm enough to cause concern.  More-
over, it was common practice in their home country to leave children 
in unlocked cars for short periods when shopping at traditional 
open-air markets.181 
To help address the challenges of refugees who lack an under-
standing of legal norms in the United States, a small group of law 
professors (including this Author), lawyers, and community college 
English-as-a-second language (“ESL”) instructors in Spokane con-
vened to provide information to refugees on U.S. law and legal pro-
cesses. 
Spokane, like some other mid-sized cities in the United States, 
has been receiving an increasing number of resettled refugees.182  For 
a variety of reasons, some states, and particular communities within 
                                                      
citizenship can be deported for a variety of criminal offenses.  See Vong Xiong v. 
Gonzales, 484 F.3d 530, 533–34 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a person who entered 
the United States as a refugee could be placed in removal procedings because of an 
aggravated felony conviction, even though his refugee status had not been termi-
nated); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006) (detailing the criminal offenses that will 
result in the deportation of previously admitted refugees). 
181 While details of this occurrence have been altered, central elements accu-
rately reflect an incident in Spokane, Washington.  E-mail from Francis Adewale, 
Spokane, WA City Public Defender, to Author (Nov. 7, 2016) (on file with the Au-
thor). 
182 World Relief Spokane Email (Nov. 3, 2016) (on file with the Author) [here-
inafter World Relief Spokane Email].  These numbers only count the refugees ini-
tially resettled in Spokane and do not take into consideration refugees who might 
have moved here after being resettled elsewhere.  The U.S. Census Bureau esti-
mated in 2016 that the population of Spokane County was 499,072.  QuickFacts: Spo-
kane City, Washington; Spokane County, Washington, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/spokanecitywashington,spokan-
ecountywashington/PST045216 [https://perma.cc/4DDQ-RUP2]. 
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those states, receive more resettled refugees than others.183  Accord-
ing to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of 
Refugee Resettlement, 3,233 refugees were resettled in Washington 
State during the fiscal year ending in September 2016.  Washington 
ranked eighth in the nation in terms of the number of refugees re-
settled during that year.184  The total number of refugees resettled in 
Spokane from 2007 through 2016 is 4,486.185 
Possibly the first area-wide program to address refugees’ lack of 
familiarity with legal norms came from Community College of Spo-
kane’s Adult Education Center (“CCS AEC”).  Since 2002, CCS AEC 
has been receiving U.S. Department of Education grants to provide 
civics instruction to students enrolled in ESL courses.186  Initially, as 
                                                      
183 Government agencies determine the locations in which refugees will be re-
settled based on a variety of factors including existing communities or relatives, the 
strength of the location’s nonprofit resettlement partner, the cost of housing, the 
availability of jobs, access to health care, and consultation with state and county 
officials.  Harris, supra note 43, at 35–36, n.13.  See Josh Sanburn, These 6 States Take 
in The Most Syrian Refugees, TIME (Sept. 10, 2016), http://time.com/4029719/syrian-
refugees-us-relocate/ [https://perma.cc/GUJ6-HCEU] (reporting that factors de-
termining resettlement locations also includes the availability of housing).  See gen-
erally ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES , U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES, 
ORR INDICATORS FOR REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT STAKEHOLDERS FISCAL YEAR 2015 9–11 
(Jan. 23, 2017) [Hereinafter ORR INDICATORS] (but note secondary migration from 
initial host). 
184 The Refugee Processing Center reports information on refugee arrivals.  
REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR., INTERACTIVE REPORTING ARRIVAL REPORTS (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2017), http://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals 
[https://perma.cc/4BGC-FNCC] (showing, when you navigate to ‘Interactive Re-
porting’ in the ‘Reports’ tab and enter the date range for Fiscal Year 2016, that seven 
states receiving more refugees than Washington were, starting with the highest 
number: California, Texas, New York, Michigan, Ohio, Arizona, and North Caro-
lina).  This is an increase from the 2015 fiscal year, ending in September, when 
Washington ranked 10th.  ORR INDICATORS, supra note 183 (identifying the nine 
states receiving more refugees than Washington in FY 2015 as, starting with the 
highest number: Texas, California, New York, Arizona, Michigan, Ohio, Georgia, 
Pennsylvania, and Illinois). 
185 World Relief Spokane Email, supra note 182. 
186 Interview with Kathy Laise, ESL Instructor and Civics Coordinator, Com-
munity Colleges of Spokane (Sept. 27, 2016) [Hereinafter Interview with Kathy 
Laise].  The grants were awarded pursuant to the Workforce Innovation Act.  See 
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), Pub. L. No. 113-128, § 243, 128 
Stat. 1624 (2014) (regulating the awarding of federal grants for the purpose of inte-
grated English literacy and civics education); see also supra notes 177–78 and accom-
panying text. 
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part of the civics instruction, lawyers visited ESL classes to intro-
duce the U.S. system of government and legal structure with the 
help of interpreters.187 
In 2013, I joined with the ESL civics program, other lawyers, and 
a refugee advocacy NGO to present a multilingual, multicultural, 
half-day workshop on U.S. Law and Justice for Refugees and Immi-
grants.  The core team creating the workshop consisted of three key 
individuals and the organizations we represented.  A Spokane city 
public defender, who also served on the board of directors of the 
nonprofit organization Refugee Connections Spokane, was dis-
tressed with defending refugees who did not understand the laws 
they had allegedly broken.188  For this reason, he wished to provide 
Spokane’s refugee community with more in-depth legal training 
than that which had been offered through the ESL courses.  I learned 
of his aspirations through my volunteer work with the same non-
profit organization.  The nonprofit had already established a work-
ing relationship with the community college center that teaches Eng-
lish to refugees along with civics instruction.  With the public 
defender identifying the areas of law that refugees most frequently 
violate, I developed a curriculum, working in collaboration with the 
ESL instructors and CCS AEC staff who provided the participants, 
knew their languages and cultural backgrounds, and had a budget 
for civics education.  Thus, a public defender, law professor, and 
ESL teacher combined efforts with support from Refugee Connec-
tions Spokane, Gonzaga University School of Law, and Community 
Colleges of Spokane to create this workshop.  A number of other 
volunteers bolstered these efforts. 
The three of us worked together to present variations of this 
workshop in October 2013, February 2015, and March, 2016. 
• The 2013 workshop included about 140 refugees and 
immigrants, representing over fourteen different lan-
guages.  Most of the substantive instruction took 
place in ten language-based breakout sessions. 
                                                      
187 Most of the students in these courses were refugees and immigrants who 
had relocated to Spokane, not visiting foreign students.  Interview with Kathy 
Laise, supra note 186. 
188 Interview with Francis Adewale, then Chair of the Board of Directors, Ref-
ugee Connections Spokane, and Spokane Public Defender (Aug. 14, 2013). 
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• The 2015 workshop reached over 180 refugees and 
immigrants, representing about sixteen languages.  
Much of the instruction occurred in nine language-
based breakout sessions. 
• The 2016 workshop included 160 refugees and immi-
grants, representing over fifteen different languages.  
The majority of substantive instruction took place in 
twelve language-based groups. 
• Each workshop included a breakout session for a 
mixed language group with no interpretation led by 
ESL-trained lawyers. 
While Spokane’s collaboration fell into place almost inadvert-
ently, other communities can intentionally work to create a similar 
team.  ESL programs across the nation receive Department of Edu-
cation grants for ESL/Civics instruction.189  These resources have 
covered most of the costs of the workshops described here and could 
help to fund similar collaborative programs for refugees in other 
communities.  Much of the remainder of this article provides more 
detail with the hope that others can replicate and improve this initi-
ative to help refugees and their communities work towards integra-
tion. 
This section outlines the workshops’ general goals, structure, lo-
gistics, and alterations over its three iterations. 
 
4.1.  Goals and Structure 
 
The workshop collaborators have maintained four goals for the 
workshops: 1) to foster a positive view of the U.S. legal system and 
                                                      
189 See Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), supra note 186, § 
243 (providing funding for integrated English literacy and civics education); see also 
Adult Education and Literacy, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (last visited Feb. 19, 
2017), https://ed.gov/about/offices/list/ovae/pi/AdultEd/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/J24L-L6GA] (describing the Office of Career, Technical, and 
Adult Education’s role in providing integrated English literacy and civics education 
grants).  Congress authorized grants to states for ESL/Civics instruction under the 
1998 Workforce Investment Act.  MICHELLE TOLBERT, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR 
LITERACY, ENGLISH LITERACY AND CIVICS EDUCATION FOR ADULT LEARNERS 8–9 (Aug. 
2001).  Congress repealed the WIA effective 2015, when it enacted WIOA. Work-
force Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), supra note 186, § 511(a). 
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state actors, given that many refugees and immigrants come from 
places where legal authority figures represent a threat; 2) to explain 
the purpose of the criminal justice system and the consequences of 
violations, particularly on immigration status; 3) to identify key civil 
rights and liberties; and 4) to provide information in writing to each 
participant in their first language. 
The first goal is crucial as it addresses the very core of why ref-
ugees were initially displaced.  A person becomes a refugee after 
being forced by fear of persecution to leave his or her country.190  The 
1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 protocol do not define persecu-
tion, but domestic and regional law fill this gap.  To rise to the level 
of persecution, the United States and other jurisdictions determine 
that acts must either be committed by a state actor or the state must 
be unwilling or unable to protect the person claiming refugee status 
from the persecution of private actors.191  Refugees, then, have cause 
to be fearful or suspicious of state actors.  Accordingly, we wanted 
to put a human face to aspects of the legal system.  Each of the work-
shops included discussions with uniformed police officers, judges, 
lawyers, and law students. 
The 2016 workshop benefitted from an address by Justice Mary 
Yu of the Washington Supreme Court who is the daughter of two 
immigrants herself.  Her distribution of pocket-sized U.S. Constitu-
tions to the participants was a highlight of the day.  A uniformed 
police officer visited each small group during that workshop and 
provided “Emergency Language Cards” for limited English profi-
cient refugees and immigrants to keep with them.192  Judging by the 
number of requests for photos with the Justice and police officer, the 
                                                      
190 See supra note 19, and accompanying text (explaining the definition of “ref-
ugee”). 
191 Id. 
192 Refugee Connections Spokane developed the wallet-sized cards and 
worked with the Spokane Police Department to train officers to ask limited-English 
speaking residents if they had a card.  Each card included space for contact infor-
mation for a person who could interpret in an emergency. 
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workshop succeeded in presenting state actors as human and ap-
proachable.193  These interactions contributed to the social links ele-
ment of integration that refers to connections between refugees and 
government entities.194 
Collaborators constructed the curriculum to meet the second 
and third goals.  To explain the purpose of the criminal justice sys-
tem and the consequences of violations, the second goal, city prose-
cutors and public defenders helped to identify the most important 
substantive areas of law to address—areas where they tend to see 
refugees having issues.  They identified domestic violence as the 
most important topic, followed by issues related to children, includ-
ing abuse and neglect.  To provide a context for these laws, the cur-
riculum addressed the general framework of the criminal justice sys-
tem, beginning with constitutional principles and the rule of law. 
To identify key civil rights and liberties, the third goal, collabo-
rators considered areas in which refugees and immigrants com-
monly experience discrimination and presented information on le-
gal protective norms.  The curriculum has addressed rights of 
people stopped by police or other authorities, the rights of children 
and parents in public schools, and rights related to housing and the 
workplace. 
This substantive instruction occurred mostly in small, language-
based groups to facilitate communication in the participants’ first 
language.  Volunteer lawyers teaching these groups introduced top-
ics with scenarios based largely on actual occurrences involving ref-
ugees.  Each participant received a translated handout with basic le-
gal rules that applied to the scenarios.  The groups then worked 
through the scenarios in an interactive manner.  Some of these 
groupings supported the social bonds domain of integration by 
helping refugees establish connections with “like-ethnic groups.”195 
Two volunteer lawyers, judges, law professors, or law students 
taught each of the break-out groups.  These volunteers followed the 
same curriculum—presented as a detailed script—but allowed for 
                                                      
193 In attempting to present the less intimidating human side to legal actors, 
we could not ignore the fact that minorities in the United States can face consider-
able risks in interactions with police.  See infra, Section 4.4. 
194 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 181 (describing social links as “the connec-
tion between individuals and structures of the state”). 
195 Id. at 178 (explaining the benefits refugees gain from connecting with “like-
ethnic groups”). 
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deviation to meet the needs and interests of their groups.  All but 
one break-out group worked with an interpreter.  The group with 
no interpreter included students with languages only spoken by one 
or two participants.  The two lawyers teaching this session had 
worked as ESL instructors, and CCS ESL instructors also provided 
assistance. 
Some of the substantive information on the general system of 
justice was conveyed in an initial plenary session presented by hon-
orary speakers or others.  Though these sessions were somewhat 
chaotic, with interpreters speaking 10 to 14 languages at once in a 
room holding over 200 people, they proved energetic and informa-
tive. 
 
4.2.  Logistics 
 
The law and CCS partnership was critical for success.  Im-
portantly, the CCS ESL students comprised almost all the workshop 
participants.196  Drawing on ESL students as the workshop partici-
pants meant that some newly-arrived refugees were excluded.  Most 
of the students in the CCS ESL classes were refugees and immigrants 
who had secured either state or federal benefits through Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) or Refugee Cash Assistance.197  
All Spokane area recipients of these benefits are referred to CCS ESL 
classes.  Some TANF beneficiaries are required to enroll in ESL 
courses as a corollary of participating in other required work-related 
activities.  Elderly refugees, those with sufficient English-language 
capacity, and those able to secure employment without ESL instruc-
tion were likely omitted from participation in the workshops. 
Including primarily ESL students in the workshops allowed or-
ganizers to forecast the language groups and numbers within each 
                                                      
196 While CCS records indicate that most of their ESL students were resettled 
refugees, others were immigrants with various visa statuses.  The workshop collab-
orators made no effort to identify or distinguish among them.  For each of the three 
workshops, all ESL teachers were invited to bring their class to the workshops.  
Only one teacher declined the invitation during one of the workshops. 
197 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Re-
settlement provides refugee cash assistance (RCA) for up to eight months after ar-
rival to qualifying refugees who are not eligible for TANF.  Kerwin, supra note 41, 
at 11. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/5
 
2017] Refugees, Rights, and Responsibilities 239 
 
one in advance of the workshop.  With this information, we could 
arrange sufficient instructional space for each breakout group, pro-
vide the correct number of handouts on the law and legal system 
translated into the languages of the participants, and ensure the 
availability of interpreters.  Organizers hoped that participants 
would share the translated material and additional information with 
others in their community who did not participate.  Providing trans-
lations and interpretation supported the language and cultural 
knowledge domain of integration.  As Ager and Strang identify, 
“[f]ostering community integration potentially means reducing bar-
riers to key information through the provision of material translated 
into the languages of refugees and other migrants.”198 
The workshops also relied on CCS’s coordination and 
ESL/Civics budget.  CCS hired former students and others to trans-
late the written handouts and serve as interpreters during the work-
shop.  CCS also arranged for buses to pick up ESL classes at four 
different locations in the city and transport participants to and from 
the workshop site.  For the first two workshops, CCS also provided 
the workshop space.  Finally, CCS provided light snacks during 
each of the workshops, as well as notepads and pens for partici-
pants. 
The workshops have depended on anywhere from twenty to 
fifty volunteer judges, lawyers, law professors, law students, police, 
and others.  Many of the volunteer teachers and presenters in the 
second and third iterations were repeat players, including students 
who had graduated and returned as lawyers to teach.  Most volun-
teers indicated that they gained more than they gave through their 
participation.  The workshops provided an opportunity for the local 
legal community and law students to interact with a population that 
is often invisible to them.  Accordingly, the workshops served to 
build the social bridges domain through linking refugees with sup-
portive members of their new community.199 
I also presented an hour-long orientation session for the volun-
teer teachers prior to each workshop.  Orientation topics included: 
the curriculum content, the types of questions participants might 
                                                      
198 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 182. 
199 See id. at 179–80 (describing the importance of building relationships be-
tween refugees and their host community and noting the value of refugees encoun-
tering friendly people in their daily lives in order to feel at home). 
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ask (and possible responses), and best practices in working with in-
terpreters. 
Two evaluations were conducted after each workshop.  I created 
a short questionnaire in very basic English for the participants.  ESL 
teachers distributed the evaluation questions to their students and 
helped them work through the language.  Some of the participants’ 
comments have been very instructive, reflecting the value of these 
workshops.200  In addition, I invited all of the volunteers to convene 
shortly after each workshop to discuss strengths and weaknesses of 
the workshop from their perspective. 
 
4.3.  Challenges and Subsequent Alterations  
 
With each presentation of the workshop, the evaluations and 
other observations identified issues or ideas to address in subse-
quent workshop iterations.  These are addressed below. 
 
4.3.1.  Content Versus Time   
 
A four-and-a-half-hour window represents less than two hours 
of instructional time in light of language interpretation, breaks, and 
transitions between rooms.  While organizers added a half-hour 
since the first workshop, the timeframe has not since expanded fur-
ther because the participants manage so many competing demands.  
In addition, there was an observable saturation as the participants 
struggled to understand the language (before interpretation) as well 
as the new legal concepts. 
These time restraints mean hard choices in terms of selecting 
content, for which there is no easy model.  Each year collaborators 
shifted the content slightly, increased the amount of small-group 
time, and shortened the plenary sessions.  Each change in content 
                                                      
200 Of the seventy-two participants who completed an evaluation from the 
2016 workshop, seventy reported that they agreed or strongly agreed with the state-
ment: “I learned important information in this workshop.”  Comments following 
that statement included: “Child abuse and neglect are different from my country,” 
and “Domestic violence is very important.”  Other general comments included: “I 
learned how the police can help me;” “I was very happy to see the judge;” and “All 
people are friendly!”.  (Evaluations on file with Author). 
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has meant reworking the translated written materials, which adds 
an additional expense. 
To help augment the restricted curriculum, the nonprofit co-
sponsor coordinated additional information and resources for the 
last workshop.  During the half-hour refreshment break, ten advo-
cacy, governmental, and social service organizations staffed tables 
in a common area, many with resources printed in different lan-
guages.201  The nonprofit organization also staffed a general table 
with resources translated into various languages.202  This resource 
opportunity further supported the integration domains of social 
bridges and links, as well as language and cultural knowledge. 
The limited time also impacted the management of participants’ 
questions.  One approach was to take questions in writing through-
out the workshop, ask the interpreters to translate them, and ad-
dress common themes during the final plenary session.  This was 
less than ideal.  A subsequent approach managed questions within 
the small groups.  This put more pressure on the volunteer teachers, 
but the use of two volunteers with different areas of legal expertise 
in each group helped in this regard.  Plus, accumulated experience 
has allowed organizers to forecast some of the difficult questions 
and prepare volunteers during the volunteer orientation to address 
these.  Fielding questions in small groups also ran the risk of dis-
couraging questions from participants who did not wish to ask them 
directly.  To ease this problem, each participant received a note pad 
and was presented with the option of submitting anonymous writ-
ten questions.  No one took advantage of this alternative.  Another 
                                                      
201 Organizations included the Spokane Volunteer Lawyer’s Program, Catho-
lic Charities, Northwest Justice Project, TeamChild, Northwest Fair Housing Alli-
ance, State Minority and Justice Commission, State Interpreter Commission, Spo-
kane Police Department, Refugee Connections Spokane, and the Washington 
Defenders Association.  Workshop organizers recognized that tabling during a 
break at an event might be a practice unfamiliar to some.  Accordingly, ESL instruc-
tors helped set the stage in advance by describing to participants this informal prac-
tice.  In addition, ESL instructors and interpreters were available to facilitate com-
munication between those staffing the tables and participants. 
202 These materials included, for example, the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion’s “Know Your Rights” in Arabic, Spanish, and Farsi; Northwest Immigrant 
Rights Project’s “Domestic Violence: Questions and Answers for Immigrants and 
Refugees” in Spanish, Vietnamese, and Chinese; Northwest Justice Project’s 
“School Rights for Immigrant and Refugee Children and Their Parents in Washing-
ton State” in Spanish and Russian; and Federal Trade Commission information on 
notario fraud.  A grant from the Law Foundation of Washington covered the cost of 
printing these materials. 
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approach to help with questions was to proactively provide infor-
mation in as many languages as possible through the tabling refer-
enced above. 
 
4.3.2.  Language Interpretation   
 
The interpreters for the breakout groups were not professional 
interpreters and many had difficulty with complex language.  For 
every iteration, I simplified the curriculum script to use plain lan-
guage and simple construction.  Interpreters received the curricu-
lum in advance of the workshop.  The shoestring budget meant that 
interpreters were not paid for preparation time.  While some have 
gone as far as writing out a translation of the materials for them-
selves, not all were able to become so well acquainted with the cur-
riculum. 
To help interpreters, I encouraged volunteer teachers during 
their orientation session to avoid legal jargon, colloquialisms, and 
complex language.  I also warned guest speakers of this barrier in 
advance and urged them to use short sentences and plain language. 
 
4.3.3.  Physical Facilities 
 
The workshop facilities require, at a minimum: one room large 
enough to hold at least 230 people; at least fourteen separate rooms 
of varying sizes for breakout sessions, a volunteer staging area, and 
lunch for visiting speakers; an area to accommodate refreshments 
for 200 or more people; and an area for informational tables during 
the refreshment break.  In addition, the workshop should be cen-
trally located with parking and be available at no cost when ESL 
classes are in session.  The first two workshop spaces required plac-
ing different small language groups in the same room and were less 
than ideal.  Locating the 2016 workshop at Gonzaga School of Law 
during its spring break worked well. 
 
4.3.4.  Photos and Media Coverage   
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Media coverage presents a dilemma.  On one hand, the work-
shops are newsworthy events.  News outlet coverage provides a 
framework for educating the general public on barriers faced by ref-
ugees and immigrants in the community.  Reporting also informs 
the community that newcomers, educators, and legal actors are join-
ing together to minimize those obstacles.  On the other hand, there 
is no media coverage without photos and video and many refugees 
and immigrants do not wish to have their images captured or broad-
cast.  Concerns run the gamut from fear of reprisals on family re-
maining in violent conflict situations to the possible discovery of an 
immigrant’s undocumented status.  The compromises incorporated 
during the 2016 workshop seemed successful.  These included: 
• Inviting specific television and print reporters who 
had previously covered refugee issues in the commu-
nity and who agreed to take images from the back of 
the large plenary session, capturing only the backs of 
participants’ heads.203 
• Arranging through the co-sponsoring NGO a former 
refugee who volunteered to meet with media for in-
dividual interviews. 
• Organizing individual interviews with guest speak-
ers. 
• Providing a volunteer professional photographer 
who took portraits of willing individuals or groups 
during the refreshment break.  He operated in a sep-
arate room to ensure his subjects had signed a plain-
language photo release form and that he would not 
inadvertently capture someone else’s image.204  He 
                                                      
203 Organizers also located in the upper balcony of the plenary session room 
the language groups that have indicated concern over photos in the past so that not 
even the backs of their heads would be captured.  In addition, collaborators sought 
advance approval from interpreters because they generally face the audience for 
whom they interpret, and thus, faced the cameras set up in the back of the plenary 
room. 
204 The CCS collaborator provided the text of this photo release form to ESL 
instructors in advance of the workshop so that students could understand the con-
tent of the release. 
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posted these photos on a website to which all partic-
ipants had the URL. 
• Asking the ESL instructors to explain to students in 
advance of the workshop that participants might see 
cameras, but that only the backs of heads would be 
included in photographs taken at the event absent 
authorization. 
 
4.4.  Specific Content Issues:  Domestic Violence and Police Violence 
 
There is a fine line between portraying legal actors, including 
police, as accessible, honest, and humane, and recognizing that po-
lice violence poses a risk for refugees and immigrants nationwide.  
The curriculum addressed this tension in two ways.  First, the mate-
rials and speakers conveyed the message that the criminal justice 
system is not perfect and much could change to protect minority 
populations.205  Second, the curriculum included a segment on po-
lice stops.  For example, recognizing that the practice in some cul-
tures is for the driver to exit the vehicle, the curriculum instructed 
on the dangers of doing so in the United States.  Underscoring a re-
lated risk, the police officer who distributed emergency language 
cards instructed recipients not to reach for them quickly during a 
police stop. 
Domestic violence, including child abuse, is also difficult for 
some groups.  All groups included both men and women, and there 
was a possibility that anyone could have been an offender or a vic-
tim.  The translated written materials provided contact information 
and resources for victims.  Because different groups have vocalized 
disagreement with domestic violence rules during earlier workshop 
renditions, organizers amended the materials and volunteer train-
ing to emphasize two points.  First, the instruction is not intended to 
generate agreement with the rules, but to highlight legal norms and 
                                                      
205 The curriculum addresses possible discrimination in the criminal justice 
system.  The chief of police made this point during the 2015 workshop in his ad-
dress to participants. 
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consequences of violations.  Second, volunteer instructors are pre-
pared for questions about how families can legally address family 
conflict, including child discipline. 
 
 
 
4.5.  Next Steps 
 
Changes to the workshop format and process, as well as addi-
tional interactive opportunities, could help advance the role of com-
munity-based legal workshops in strengthening the social bridges 
element of integration.206 
Within the current workshop format, for example, the organiz-
ers could involve refugees more in revising the curriculum and in 
workshop planning beyond making adjustments based on refugees’ 
evaluative comments.  More time could be included for participants 
to address the legal systems and cultures in their country of origin 
so that learning can be more cross-cultural. 
In addition, collaborators could train refugee community lead-
ers on legal rights and on resources that provide legal help and in-
formation.  Training could assist these leaders in facilitating access 
to these resources within their communities.207  Leaders could then 
help others understand when they might have a right to legal pro-
tection and how to go about investigating options for asserting their 
rights. 
Finally, a common theme that has run throughout the three 
workshop renditions involves U.S. law and cultural norms sur-
rounding gender roles and family relations.  Invariably, participants 
seek more information on parenting, disciplining children, and re-
solving family conflicts.  Some groups also express concern over 
gender roles both within and outside of families.208  Other observers 
have commented on the lack of resources provided by the U.S. re-
                                                      
206 These conclusions stem solely from the Author’s observations and have not 
emerged as part of the collaborative workshop process. 
207 For example, accessing Washington State’s civil legal aid resources is a chal-
lenge, even for those who speak English well. 
208 One volunteer teacher recalls a male participant proclaiming that “the U.S. 
has rights only for women.”  Interview with Mary Pat Treuthart (Jan. 20, 2017). 
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settlement process to address the challenges of parenting and men-
toring children in what is, for many, a profoundly different cultural 
environment.209  A productive follow-up step could involve creating 
workshops concentrating specifically on these sensitive issues. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
National security and refugee protection are not mutually exclu-
sive.  The United States can work to protect its security and simulta-
neously uphold its humanitarian and legal commitment to protect 
refugees.  Integration of resettled refugees can complement rather 
than weaken national security. 
As a UNHCR resettlement state, the United States has an obliga-
tion to promote the integration of the refugees it admits.  A two-way 
process of integration can enhance successful resettlement and bol-
ster the security of refugees and the communities in which they re-
locate. 
To date, the United States refugee resettlement program has not 
effectively promoted sustainable resettlement nor met the UNHCR 
mandate to facilitate integration.  The program’s singular focus on 
rapid economic self-sufficiency makes long-term economic inde-
pendence difficult for some refugees to attain and does little to ad-
dress other elements deemed central to integration.  The assumption 
that refugees can successfully resettle by immediate participation in 
the work force reflects a free-market approach to social welfare that 
analysts have disparaged, especially since the 2008 financial crisis. 
Local communities can support refugee integration even in the 
absence of a U.S. integration policy.  Community welcoming efforts 
are even more important when national anti-immigrant sentiment 
incubates hostile environments.  A community workshop to help 
refugees become familiar with their legal rights and obligations is 
just one example of an initiative that facilitates integration.  It does 
so by strengthening the rights and citizenship foundation of integra-
tion and contributing to the domains of social connections, and lan-
guage and cultural knowledge. 
                                                      
209 Hing, supra note 139, at 1898 (addressing the lack of resources provided to 
refugees to help them aquire long-term parenting skills in a new environment 
where “old country approaches” fail). 
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Integration represents more than a public policy challenge for 
resettlement states or an experiment in theory for scholars.  Local 
integration efforts centered on law have produced tangible benefits.  
Participants’ evaluations consistently indicate they have learned im-
portant information.  City prosecutors dismissed charges against 
three refugees who participated in the workshops following their 
alleged infractions.210  Others hopefully have used their knowledge 
of the criminal justice system to avoid violations.  Some may have 
sought an interpreter at a child’s school or asserted other rights in-
troduced to them.  Dozens of volunteer lawyers now understand 
more about this diverse population, including shared desires to 
keep families safe and connected and to invest in children’s futures.  
Such interactions can cultivate mutual safety and wellbeing by blur-
ring the imaginary line between “us” and “them.” 
 
 
                                                      
210 E-mail from Justin Bingham, Spokane City Prosecutor, to Author (Jan. 16, 
2017) (on file with Author) (noting that none of the three have returned with sub-
sequent charges to the best of his knowledge). 
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